



Daily Report

East Europe

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Order To Downgrade Army Posts Causes 'Tension'

AU2712134895 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
20 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Lyubomir Denov: "Tension in Army?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Army General Staff chief's order has provoked tension among the troops. It became known yesterday that Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov had stopped the order.

General Tsvetan Totomirov ordered that as of 1 January the staffs of the three armed services and the three armies should be reduced in rank by one grade. According to a Defense Ministry source, this means massive cuts in the payrolls and the elimination of a number of officers' and generals' posts. The pay of those who manage to hang on to their posts will be reduced by 400 to 1,500 leva per month, and considerable numbers of officers, whose ranks will not correspond to their new duties, will be dismissed from the Army in a couple of months, when the new Defense Act comes into force.

According to the concept for the Army reform, the First, Second, and Third Armies are to be transformed into Army corps during 1996 and 1997. However, Gen. Totomirov's order does not envisage redeployment of the units, but a mechanical replacement of each headquarters with a smaller one.

As informed sources point out, on 1 January the Bulgarian Army Inspectorate begins to function. According to them, the transfer of officers onto the Inspectorate's payroll will further exacerbate the already complicated situation.

The National Assembly deputies have approved the Inspectorate, but the Defense Ministry chiefs will not wait for the Defense Act to come into force. The orders regarding the Inspectorate are reported to be ready. If the president again refuses to issue decrees, the generals are reportedly supposed to start working in an acting capacity.

I am sure that the Defense Ministry will protect the servicemen's pay, Khristo Smolenov, parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Defense, told 24 CHASA. According to him, it would be fairer and more socially responsible for the order to take effect on 1 January 1997, when the new pay scales will start operating.

Army Chief's, Minister's Dispute

AU2712134995 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
20 Dec 95 p 12

[Editorial: "Quarrels Between the Defense Minister and General Staff are Out of Fashion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is nothing new for the defense minister and chief of General Staff to have differences.

In their time, the rows between Dimitur Ludzhev, Aleksandur Staliyski, and Valentin Aleksandrov, [former defense ministers] on the one side, and General Lyuben Petrov, on the other, caused further complications in the armed forces' already serious predicament.

Today, the opponents have merely swapped places. Whereas previously the chief of General Staff was a Red, and the ministers representatives of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], now the opposite is true. While Defense Minister Pavlov implements the Videnov cabinet's military policy, Gen. Totomirov tries to consolidate President Zhelev's positions in the Army.

The General Staff chief's over-hasty order (see the report on page 1), far from improving the officers' social status, was a retrograde step.

Mityo the Good [Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov] and Toto the Iron-Fisted [Gen. Totomirov] should sit down together and reach an understanding. It is high time for the two of them to realize that the Army is above the political parties and that the defense of the fatherland has no political color.

Premyanov on Parliament Majority-Cabinet Relations

AU2712150895 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
22 Dec 95 p 14

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, by Romyana Strugarova; place and date not given: "There Is No Reason To Speak About Contradictions Between the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Strugarova] Which of the internal problems of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is most dangerous for the party itself and for our society, inasmuch as the BSP is the ruling party?

[Premyanov] I would not specify a separate problem. I think the BSP will preserve its unity. It is normal when there are differences and ideological currents within a party. Furthermore, a democratic organization presupposes differences when they are a matter of different views. It is the lack of such differences that

represents a danger for the party. We can reach the truth only through competition between different ideas. Everything the BSP has done so far has been to free itself of the mistakes and heritage of the past.

[Strugarova] Did the Cabinet succeed in implementing the BSP program of governing the country during its first year in office?

[Premyanov] This cabinet had to create the foundation of a stable movement in the direction of continuing the reforms. In this sense, the Cabinet was successful. However, it appears that expectations, most of all in our society, were exaggerated and went beyond the realistic assessment of the economic difficulties the government had to overcome.

[Strugarova] Is there tension in the relations between the government and the parliamentary majority?

[Premyanov] The relations are very dynamic. As you see, real life poses problems daily, and we cooperate in resolving them. There is no reason to speak about contradictions between the Cabinet and the parliamentary faction. However, regardless of what organizational foundations we establish for those relations, life disproves preset schemes. I think that the parliamentary faction consists of people who view themselves responsible for implementing the policy of the cabinet they elected and the policy of the democratic left as a whole.

[Strugarova] Will Zhan Videnov reshuffle his Cabinet?

[Premyanov] I think that changes in the government are something natural. If the prime minister has such intentions, the parliamentary faction will contribute its opinion to the debate.

[Strugarova] However, the majority will not insist on replacing ministers?

[Premyanov] You should pose this question to the prime minister. [passage omitted]

[Strugarova] You are about to present your report on your one-year activity as chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction. Do you think you will be reelected for a second mandate?

[Premyanov] I think that the leadership of the parliamentary faction coped well with its duties during the year, and there is no reason it should not continue. However, it is the faction itself that will decide this. I think that the issue should be resolved before the parliamentary vacation because it is appropriate to begin the new session with the election of the parliamentary faction's leadership. [passage omitted]

BSP's Lilov on Party-Cabinet-Faction Relations

AU2712151095 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
22 Dec 95 p 13

[Interview with former BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov, by Boryana Kostova; place and date not given: "I Expect Zhan Videnov To Initiate Personnel Changes in the Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kostova] Recently, you stepped up your public criticism and raised the issue of personnel changes. People are saying that this is a result of deteriorating relations between the Cabinet, the parliamentary faction, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Supreme Council.

[Lilov] I do not think there is a confrontation now between the parliamentary faction, the Cabinet, and Politburo [BSP headquarters]. I am sure that the parliamentary faction will categorically support Prime Minister Zhan Videnov in the coming no-confidence motion. At the same time, relations should be constructed so that each of those factors implements functions that are exclusively its own. There should be neither merging nor imposing of functions, and the independence of each of the three factors should not be ignored. Let the party form a strong policy and control its implementation. Let the parliamentary majority enact good laws and ensure support for the cabinet. And let the cabinet govern efficiently. No one should seize functions, roles, rights, and responsibilities from anyone else.

[Kostova] Then where is the corrective factor that every government needs?

[Lilov] It should be sought in several directions. The first is public opinion. Our government and party must monitor this corrective instrument very carefully. When I say "must" I mean that it is not being done sufficiently. The party too must be a corrective instrument. It is the party that is responsible to the voters, and it must also determine whether we have been ruling well and in what areas it is necessary to improve the work of the parliamentary majority and Cabinet. A more intensive dialogue, both in parliament and outside, with all parties, could also be a corrective instrument. We must not allow arrogance. Nor must we ignore political dialogue with our partners and opposition opponents alike, or allow it to abate, especially on issues of national priority and interest. [passage omitted]

[Kostova] According to deputies of the Democratic Left, conditions have emerged of a struggle between various groups, led by different persons. The people are speaking about Lilovites, Lukanovites, and Videnovites.

[Lilov] It is a positive factor when a party has noteworthy figures. If circles that personify the tendencies they

represent emerge around them, one must not necessarily view it in a negative light. When a party does not have noteworthy figures, it has a dramatic problem. Indeed, this drama has been on the stage of the Bulgarian political theater for a rather long time. It would be bad if splits, animosities, and a struggle between clans and selfish interests were to emerge in the BSP. I do not fear the fact that there are figures in the BSP who occasionally have different opinions on the same issue. If you want me to be absolutely sincere, I fear a struggle between people with different economic interests within the BSP. [passage omitted]

[Kostova] Is there a cadre crisis within the BSP? Does it have enough personalities from different generations who could rule long? After all, the party announced that it intends to be in power for at least two or three further mandate periods.

[Lilov] The BSP must declare its willingness or, rather, responsibility to lead Bulgaria out of the economic crisis and check our society's attitude toward this. A single mandate is not enough for this. If the voters believe in the policy we propose to overcome the crisis—and it differs from the destructive policy conducted until one year ago—the BSP should be given time. Therefore, we really want two or three additional mandate periods, and if we govern well, we will have them.

There is no cadre crisis in the BSP. It still has a great potential of modern leaders in all areas and from all generations. The issue is to avoid isolation in a narrow circle and the emergence of an oligarchy in improving and distributing the cadre potential.

[Kostova] In other words, the BSP does not have a problem with selecting a winning candidate for the post of president?

[Lilov] I am convinced of this.

[Kostova] And the BSP has no intention of supporting Zhelyu Zhelev even secretly in the presidential elections? This could be done also by nominating a weak candidate.

[Lilov] Any BSP politician who, overtly or tacitly, supports Zhelyu Zhelev in 1995 will be viewed as a very strange figure in our party. The BSP today is not what it was five or six years ago. It has not completed its renewal, but it has overcome many crises, like the crisis of confidence and the political and ideological crises. It can nominate very strong candidates for the post of Bulgarian president. [passage omitted]

DPS To Hold National Conference 27-28 Apr

AU2712124595 Sofia PRAVA I SVOBODI
in Bulgarian 22 Dec 95 p 1

[Editorial: "National Conference Means Revival Process"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] National Conference will take place on 27-28 April 1996, the DPS Central Council decided at its last meeting. The principles of conducting the accountability-election meetings and conferences incorporated in the draft proposed by Osman Oktay were discussed in detail. Guner Tahir and Kemal Eyub made proposals and critical remarks.

It became clear in the debate that the DPS's task during the preparations for the national conference will be to strengthen the party. "Conference are not held only in order to make personnel changes. If changing the leadership is the only problem, I could resolve it at any moment because the charter empowers me to do so," Ahmed Dogan said. Obviously, the real objective will be to renew and activate the structures. The process of revival must begin at the bottom, and most of the DPS membership must take part in the revival processes.

The problem of stagnation in local structures was raised again. The alarming fact was pointed out that many local organizations deliberately do not admit new members. There have been cases where membership applications have not been reviewed for more than a year.

What will the new principle of selecting delegates to the conference be? This basic issue generated a lengthy debate. Three basic approaches emerged—on the basis of the membership, on the basis of the election results, and a compromise variant, which proposes to elect 50 percent of the delegates on the basis of the membership body and 50 percent on the basis of the election results. Which approach will be preferred will be determined by the 16 February meeting, when the principles of the election will be clarified.

Nuclear Committee Chief: Fewer Incidents in 1995

AU2712182395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At present the Nos. 1, 2, and 6 reactor units at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant are operating at 95 percent of their capacity, the No. 3 unit is operating at 85 percent, and the No. 5 unit—at 90 percent. The No. 4 reactor is being prepared for hydraulic tests in connection with its forthcoming startup.

BULGARIA

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The Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy announced this information, whose chairman, Yanko Yanev, described 1995 as a good year for nuclear safety, on the basis of the Nuclear Safety Convention that Bulgaria ratified and the Amendments and Additions to the Law on Utilization of Atomic Energy passed by the Bulgarian parliament. Yanev said that during 1995 the number of incidents recorded involving radioactive sources at the nuclear power plant were fewer than in previous years.

Permit Issued for Startup of No 4

AU2312141795 *Sofia Khorizont Radio Network*
in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has issued a permit for the startup of the No. 4 reactor unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. This was announced today by Atanas Koychev, director of power production at the plant. According to BTA, the inspection team set certain conditions that the Kozloduy operating team has to implement within 24 hours.

The 440-megawatt No. 4 unit is being recommissioned following planned maintenance and recharging with nuclear fuel. According to Atanas Koychev, the reactor will reach its minimum controllable output by the end

of this week, following which it will be reconnected to the national power grid.

Official Reacts to Reports on India Arms Deal

AU2712150495 *Sofia Khorizont Radio Network*
in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria adheres strictly to all international requirements in exporting its specialized production. All Bulgarian foreign trade deals with India that involve arms have been made with authorized official Indian organs, Ivan Kolev, deputy chairman of the Intergovernmental Council on Issues of the Military-Industrial Complex, said in an interview for Sofia radio.

Regarding reports in the Indian and Bulgarian press about the seizure of Bulgarian-made arms intended for Indian terrorists, Mr. Kolev explained that, if Bulgarian weapons delivered to other states have in fact been transferred to Indian territory, Bulgaria's name and the names of organizations licensed to trade with specialized production should not be connected with these provocations.

In response to our correspondent's question, Mr. Kolev said that, so far, there has been no request from the Indian authorities to the Bulgarian Government for clarification of the case.

Commentary Views Past Problems in FRG Ties
AU2812111195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
16 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Dusan Trestik: "Apropos the Talks Between David and Goliath"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was a magnificent polished speech, the one with which Richard von Weizsaecker completed in the Carolinum on 14 December the cycle of "talks about neighborliness" begun in February by Vaclav Havel's now memorable address. At that time, he surprised not only the German, but, to a considerable extent, also the domestic Czech public by his blunt rejection of those attitudes that had tried to formulate a judgment on the future of Czech-German relations out of the judgments on their past. While official Bonn, obviously unprepared for anything like this, maintained a puzzled silence, a hullabaloo was raised here and there throughout Europe about his betrayal of an intellectual's mission, which, apparently, consists of self-styled sitting on a judge's bench in a robe made out of newspaper and a cap with tinkling bells guaranteeing freedom of speech. Here at home just under 100 intellectuals and would-be intellectuals festooned with tinkling bells protested furiously and demanded, according to the tried-and-tested recipe, paper games, reconciliation, and empathy.

To put it plainly, the issue involved from the beginning, and still does, the transfer of the Czech ("Sudeten") Germans. While German policy has come to terms with the mass postwar transfer of Germans from eastern countries, as with the repercussions of a lost war and the decisionmaking of the victors, it refuses to do so in this individual case because the Sudeten German voters are one of the main supports of the Bavarian Christian Social Union [CSU]. The hypocritical (because it is related expediently just to this particular case) but effective reasoning, using the tenets of coexistence among peoples, international law, and the principles of a united Europe—all, of course, contemporary principles that did not exist 50 years ago or existed differently, in another form—is based on their feeling of injustice, which was amply fostered throughout the period of the Cold War. So the impression is being created successfully that everyone who approves of the transfer approves of the current ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Judgment about the past is becoming judgment about the present. Therefore, the Czech president caused such a stir when he refused to play this game of empty morality and subordinating oneself to (necessarily perceived differently) history.

Richard von Weizsaecker agrees with him. He would also not like "politics to be elevated above morality

and morality above politics as can often be observed in German-Czech relations." He arrives at the understanding that "history has not prepared any absolutely generally applicable truth for us," but... The issue now, in the ongoing talks on a joint declaration by the parliaments, involves this "but." Agreement was reached that "the key to success is a relationship between the past and the future," according to Weizsaecker, "a definitive line under the past." Of course, these various "buts" are necessarily attached to this. No one on the Czech side, however, wants this; Czech diplomacy is merely pushing for a clear declaration that, in our relations, we will not return politically and legally to the past, that we will not draw conclusions from it burdening relations between the states. Despite this, we may see it differently quite well. Weizsaecker has nothing against this. He says that "although we answer the questions of the past differently, this must not burden our relations today or in the future." "Everyone concerned knows that none of us can cast doubt on the existence of a neighboring state with its own political and legal system. During several decades, this system formed the basis for human fates. It is impossible to give them back. All the rest is fiction, and it is necessary to deal openly with it."

Of course, he means the "fiction" of Mr. Neubauer. Nevertheless, the evacuation of the Czech Germans did have its understandable reasons, "but all of this does not make the expulsion and the 1945 expropriation decrees and their appalling realization bearable. They were immoral because they proceeded from the collective guilt of an entire ethnic group.... Therefore, the verdict pronounced by a Brno court this year disturbed us so much because, even after 50 years, it proceeds from apparent collective responsibility and legitimizes the indisputable acts of injustice at that time."

So, round and round we go. The past should not burden us, but it "disturbs" us, so we have to at least "call it by its proper name." From a moral and ideational point of view, making sure that the wounds of the past can be "healed" must belong here. Therefore, we will define it unequivocally in the joint declaration and will declare in one breath that we will not return to it legally and politically. Such a declaration is not legally binding; it is just an expression of political will. If we append "calling things by their proper names" to this expression of will ("expulsion," "iniquity," and "injustice"), it will then be up to the discretion of one and all whether they make a reference to the intention not to return to the past or to "calling things by their proper names," which implicitly contains political and legal consequences. We will formulate a defective product on both sides. If the Czech side prevents this, it is not "immoral," just prudent. That is, "calling things by their proper names"

would mean entering into an endless and fruitless weighing up of mutual injustices, a mutual modifying of incommensurable truths, so that the concrete result of this wading in the sticky mud of overwhelmingly unpleasant historical circumstances could be (in the best case) just concessionary "bla bla" (as Edmund Stoiber says).

A German side insisting on "calling things by their proper names" is either behaving unwisely or simply wants to appease the Bavarian CSU voters. Either it is "moral" or "pragmatic." It can be both; Goliath can indulge in morality with regard to David. "David was injured, but look what he did to Goliath." On the one hand, this satisfies his own conscience and, on the other, it is an excellent, at any time of need, useful argument. It is far stronger than little David's weak protests (because, of course, Goliath is stronger). It is perhaps obvious that this cannot lead to anything beneficial.

This is the vicious circle in which the current talks are proceeding. Richard von Weizsaecker, despite his many

beautiful words and elevated thoughts, has not found a clear and unequivocal way out of it. He has, however, pointed to something that we here in the Czech lands are not very well aware of. It seems to us that the declaration and settling of our relations with Germany are only in our interest. They are not; they are also in the Germany's interest. Weizsaecker is surely right when he says that Germany does not want to—and cannot—be a traditional, anti-Western "power of the center," and he is right when he gives the assurance that the new Germany does not want to establish a new cordon sanitaire against Russia on its eastern borders. However, it will be unreliable in its efforts for European integration if it continues to have unsettled relations with its neighbor. A Goliath squabbling with his neighbor little David will not create the best impression on the big Davids he is earnestly trying to persuade to move into the same house that he is in. This is one of little David's chances.

Replacement of Police President 'Being Prepared'

AU2712150595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Dec 95
p 1

[Report by "pt": "Personnel Changes Planned in Slovak Republic Police Corps"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Our editorial office has managed to find out that J. Satek, director of the Regional Office of Investigations in Bratislava, is soon to be recalled from his post and that this move will apparently be followed by the dismissal of Jozef Holdos, president of the Slovak Republic Police Corps. Satek's post is to be taken up by investigator Zavada from Roznava. According to our information, Satek was to be recalled at the time Prosecutor R. Vlachovsky took investigator P. Vacok off the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction abroad. Even the option of taking Satek and Vacok into custody was considered at that time, but this plan was abandoned, in view of the tense atmosphere then.

Signals that the replacement of the police president is being prepared are coming also from the Ministry of Interior because Minister L. Hudek [from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] has lost confidence in J. Holdos, who is leaning politically toward the coalition Slovak National Party [SNS].

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 December on page 4 carries a 400-word commentary by Peter Toth entitled "Will L. Hudek Sacrifice J. Holdos?" The commentary elaborates on Slovak Information Service Director Ivan Lexa's alleged "wrath" against Interior Minister Hudek because of Hudek's alleged "loss of control" over J. Simunic and P. Vacok, the first investigators of the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction abroad. Toth believes that, to shed the suspicion of loss of loyalty and the responsibility for investigators Simunic's and Vacok's course of action, Hudek will "sacrifice" Police President Holdos. According to Toth, "Hudek realizes that the professional competence of Police President Holdos is the lowest of all post-November [1989] police chiefs. He also knows that, politically, J. Holdos is very close to the SNS, which is causing the prime minister problems at home and abroad. L. Hudek is skillfully using both these facts to transfer Ivan Lexa's distrust of him, Hudek, toward Holdos."]

KDH Denounces 'Attacks' on Catholic Church

AU2212145795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
20 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "Christian Democratic Movement on Attacks on the Church"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Club of Deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic observes with indignation and alarm the growing attacks by government-supported newspapers, as well as official agencies of government power, on representatives of the Catholic Church. In a statement issued yesterday, the KDH Club of Deputies states, furthermore, that, in the summer, police units carried out a search of the residence of the chairman of the Slovak Bishops' Conference without proper subsequent explanation. Recently, criminal prosecution agencies commenced criminal proceedings against Jozef Hrtus, head of the Banska Bystrica Bishopric's Office, which, according to the KDH representatives, is reminiscent of the methods of political intimidation practiced by the communist state in the past. The deputies declare that the reason they became involved in Slovakia's public life, as Christians and also as citizens, was to prevent the recurrence of such methods.

SDL's Fico on Relations With HZDS, His Future

AU1512202195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
11 Dec 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Robert Fico, chairman of the Common Choice Parliamentary Club, by Martin Krno; place and date not given: "I Am Not Concerned About the SDL's Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krno] Reports appeared in the press a few days ago, according to which you are contemplating a radical change regarding your political activity. What is this supposed to mean?

[Fico] I want to devote far more attention to professional issues than to the leadership of the parliamentary club. I believe that I will be of greater use when I devote the efforts that have dedicated to the leadership of the club to the preparation of specialist projects for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. I am 31 and he who has never been a scholar can ill be a master. I need to study all the time and to work on my self-improvement. I do not want to become arrested in my development [zakrpatiet] at the age of 30 as a professional politician. I will continue working as a parliamentary deputy and, should the state be interested in my services, I would also like to continue acting as an

agent [agent] representing Slovakia before the European Commission and the European Court for Human Rights.

[Krno] Is this activity in conformity with the law on the conflict of interests?

[Fico] I have solved this problem in such a way that I will work in this job for 2,450 Slovak korunas [official minimum wage] gross. I really want the defense of my client—the Slovak Republic—to be on a highly professional level.

[Krno] Can this decision be understood to mean that your name will not appear among the candidates for the post of SDL chairman?

[Fico] May 1996, when the fourth SDL congress will probably take place, is still far away. Our idea on the SDL Executive Committee is to reach a political agreement in advance on a single candidate. However, I do not rule out the possibility of someone proposing someone for chairman directly at the congress. Right now I am not going to comment on the issue of my candidacy. Anything is possible.

[Krno] The Meciarites have supposedly enlisted in your parliamentary club the eight deputies they need to obtain a constitutional majority. Are you among them?

[Fico] My name always figures in some group of deputies. I can say, however, that no one has ever discussed this issue with me. SDL deputies surely will not do anything that would be undemocratic and anticonstitutional. All this is only self-serving talk designed to sow seeds of nervousness in our ranks. The opposite is true. The precongress atmosphere is uniting us more than someone may desire. Peter Weiss's announcement that he will not run for SDL chairman [at the party congress] has also been helpful in this regard. I am not in the least concerned about the SDL's future.

[Krno] And what about the recent statements by SDL Deputy Chairman Kanis, presented at party as well as at public forums, that the SDL must hurry to get into the government, if for no other reason than because it will otherwise miss the last chance to privatize anything?

[Fico] This is the personal view of Pavol Kanis, which need not be taken away from him. There exists no decision of party bodies that the SDL should consider joining the government coalition. The other side of the coin, to which it is necessary to pay heed, is the existence of a certain political paradox, namely that a part of the Slovak left and the Slovak right is in the government, and another part in the opposition. Under certain conditions—in the event of positive signals pointing to Slovakia's democratic development, for

example—I can imagine closer cooperation and possibly even participation by the SDL in the government.

[Krno] One year ago, the SDL Republican Board approved conditions under which it would be ready to negotiate on its participation in the government. These included demands for a change in the undemocratic conditions in parliament and in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's [HZDS] style as a political culture, the halting of attacks on the head of state, and the abandonment of plans for expedient changes to the Constitution. Has the present government coalition fulfilled these conditions?

[Fico] We all realize that it has not fulfilled them. Had our conditions been fulfilled, the SDL probably would have entered into a dialogue on the possibility of forming a [new] government coalition. At the moment, the SDL remains an opposition party. [passage omitted]

[Krno] Some SDL representatives promoting closer cooperation with the HZDS are supposedly inclined to agree with [HZDS Deputy Chairman] Huska on a certain compromise version of the bill on anticommunist resistance....

[Fico] This information apparently comes from the other side. There have not been any official talks. The draft for which HZDS deputies are pushing is unacceptable to us. Why should parliament approve laws that will divide society further?! I will continue to divide people only into those who observe laws and those who do not.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 11 December on pages 1 and 2 carries a 500-word report by Martin Kovacic on an SDL Executive Committee meeting held in Bratislava on 9 December to discuss the party's position on the 1996 state budget and other items on the agenda of the 12th Parliament meeting. According to the report, "Robert Fico announced that, in view of the fact that, personally as well as politically, 1995 was the most difficult year of his life, he will not run for the post of chairman of the parliamentary club."]

Poll on Trust in Political, Public Personalities

AU2712151295 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Dec 95
p 2

[Report by "r": "Trust in Both Vladimir Meciar and Michal Kovac Has Declined, According to FOCUS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The FOCUS agency carried out a public opinion poll from 1 to 11 December 1995, based on a representative sample of 1,004 respondents. Respondents' replies to the question of which personalities in political and public life they trust the most are illustrated by the following table. Each respondent could give a maximum of three names:

	Dec 95	Oct 95
	Percent	
Michal Kovac	6.4	19.2
Ivan Gasparovic	15.3	12.1
Peter Weiss	10.8	9.7
Jan Carnogursky	8.9	8.3
Jozef Moravcik	8.1	6.8
Brigita Schmognerova	6.1	3.9
Mikulas Dzurinda	6.0	2.3
Bela Bugar	5.9	4.5

The 2-percent limit was also crossed in December 1995 by Jan Slota (4.1 percent), Sergej Kozlik (3.9), Milan Cic (3.5), Jan Luptak (3.3), Jan Langos (2.1), Lubomir Fogas (2.1), Ivan Simko (2.0), and Roman Kovac (2.0).

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 22 December on page 1 carries a 150-word report by "ev" on the FOCUS poll, which adds that "23.1 percent of respondents do not trust anyone, compared with 25.2 percent in October 1995."]

Daily Analyzes 1995 Privatization Sales AU2712153695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava SME in Slovak on 19 and 21 December, on page 2 in each instance, publishes in two installments a 1,200-word article by "rk" on direct privatization sales approved by the National Property Fund (FNM) Presidium since 2 February, when the current FNM leadership assumed office. The first installment of the article is headlined "0.06 Percent of the Purchase Price—Record First Installment for Privatized Property," the second installment "Foreign Entities Acquired 770 Million Slovak Korunas [Sk] Worth of Property Through Direct Sales."

Citing "data available thus far," the SME correspondent states that, since 2 February 1995, the FNM Pre-

sidium has issued 336 decisions on direct privatization sales. The aggregate purchase price of this property was Sk35,408 billion. Of this sum, the buyers were to pay a total Sk6.6 billion—that is, more than 18 percent of the aggregate purchase price, in first installments. The SME correspondent points out, however, that, in some cases, the first installment fell significantly short of this average ratio. Businessman Pavol Cupka from Banska Bystrica, for example, had to pay a first installment of only Sk200,000 to acquire the Zvolen meat combine, whose book value is more than Sk327 million. The first installment thus represented a mere 0.06 percent of the book value. Other "interesting FNM decisions," according to SME, included the sale of 39 percent of shares of the Slovnaft refinery, worth Sk6.422 billion, to the Slovintegra company, for a first installment of only Sk100 million (1.55 percent of the purchase price), or the sale of 67 percent of shares of Duslo Sala, a chemicals company, worth Sk2.665 billion, to the Prezam Sala company, for a first installment of Sk50 million (1.87 percent of the purchase price). According to the SME article, of the 336 decisions on direct privatization sales, only five decisions concerned sales to "buyers resident abroad": The French Venishard Holding SA La Ventenaye acquired 67 percent of the GeLima Liptovsky Mikulas company; the Aarsen Internation BV of the Netherlands acquired the Nitra-Luzianky plant of the "Strojnakup" engineering company; the Heineken International Beheer VB of the Netherlands acquired 17 percent of the shares of the "Golden Pheasant" brewery in Hurbanovo; Rockwool International A/S of Denmark acquired 50 percent of the shares of Izomat Nova Bana; and Theodora Laurentius of Belgium acquired 11.09 percent of the shares of the ICT Bratislava company. The aggregate purchase price of the property sold to these five non-Slovak entities was Sk770.25 million. Given that a total of Sk35,408 billion worth of property was sold by the FNM Presidium in direct sales this year, the SME reporter says in conclusion, the sum of Sk770.25 million means that only 2.175 percent of all property sold in direct sales went to foreign buyers.

MDF MP Opposes Participation in Bosnia IFOR
AU2712153595 Budapest REFORM in Hungarian
 22 Dec 95 p 18

[Interview with Imre Mecs, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, and Miklos Csapodi, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) MP and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, by Laszlo Deaki; place and date not given: "Mission at the Sava"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] With 281 votes in favor, 44 against, and 10 abstentions, the National Assembly recently approved Hungary's participation in the peaceful ending of the south Slav (Bosnian) crisis as part of the so-called IFOR [Implementation Force] forces by sending a maximum of 500 technical troops. [passage omitted] Although the National Assembly's decision is final, many people still doubt whether it made the right decision in view of our special regional position. Our correspondent Laszlo Deaki contrasted opposing views.

Can We Go to Bosnia?

[Passage omitted]

[Csapodi] The real question is whether, in addition to supporting NATO within our borders, it is indeed necessary to send this Hungarian unit. In my view, it is not! We should not have entered this!

[Deaki] Why not?

[Csapodi] Rather than on moral or emotional arguments, this rejection is mainly based on the fact that—as comrade Grosz [former prime minister] would say at the time, and he was right in this—in whichever direction Hungarian soldiers leave this country, they step on Trianon territory. We should have been content by assisting the NATO peacekeeping mission within Hungary. We should literally have stopped at our own borders.

[Deaki] Those who will go are, after all, soldiers, whatever their task may be. Is there a qualitative difference between soldiers?

[Csapodi] There is. I agree with Gyorgy Keleti [defense minister]: Without a weapon, a soldier is not a soldier. For this very reason we should not be sending soldiers. In addition, it is a serious mistake to consider any type of participation in peacekeeping as a simple tactical exercise carried out in live circumstances. It is a strange argument that the Hungarian army has not lately had the chance to try out what it actually can do. And now we will "try" it and "prove" ourselves. Hungarian diplomacy carries serious responsibility for, presumably, not having adequately informed the international partners

about our country's special situation in the region, the historical relationship with the neighbors, and the often futile Hungarian initiatives on reconciliation. With adequate information, they could have understood our concerns. Although diplomacy presented an almost ready situation to parliament, our parliament actually leaped in the dark with its decision. Its responsibility is unavoidable. No matter how many people keep emphasizing that the security risks are minimal, they do exist. Whatever its size is, we can worry about our men. They will serve in a region where an ancient attraction exists for the armed "way of life," and where they have to fulfill their tasks among people who have been actively living the lifestyle of killing for years. Anything can happen. This decision forces our people into this situation. I naturally trust that there will not be any casualties and that no coffins will be needed. I do not wish to cast the shadows of the future on the parliamentary decision with the "ill will of the opposition" but....

[Deaki] Would we have missed a special opportunity for joining NATO if we had said no, if we do not go?

[Csapodi] What is the value of a membership that will depend on whether 500 Hungarian soldiers perform technical tasks? Not much....

Army's Biro on U.S. Aircraft Tracking Concerns

LD2712160595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
 in Hungarian 1100 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Americans are criticizing the lack of a fence around the Taszar airport [one of the southern Hungarian bases for U.S. IFOR troops]. Laszlo Farago reports from Kaposvar:

[Farago] The guarding of the IFOR [Implementation Force] bases in the southern Hungarian towns of Kaposvar and Taszar are being conducted jointly by Hungarian and American soldiers. Despite this, in my experience, primarily the American military police decide whom is allowed to enter the compound. [passage omitted]

American military policemen armed with machine guns provide the security of the airport. [passage omitted]

The measures tightening security have been felt since General William Crouch's [commanding general, U.S. Army, Europe] and Gen. Georges Joulwan's [NATO supreme allied commander, Europe] visit to Taszar. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Karoly Levai has interviewed Lieutenant Gen. Bela Biro, deputy commander of the Hungarian army, on the phone about this. Biro is also the head of the operative committee coordinating the activities of NATO forces:

[Begin recording] [Levai] Why are the Americans irritated by the fact that the radars of the Hungarian air defense missiles track the movements of military helicopters?

[Biro] They are not air defense missiles, but a radar system operating in the interests of the Hungarian air defense. It is doing its standard duty, and in the course of this, it also locates and tracks these aircraft. Probably the helicopters' intelligence system locates this equipment and is aware that they are in operation.

A suitable expert from our side is on location today. This issue is being examined because we must control, in any way, the flights to and from the Hungarian-Croatian border.

[Levai] However, the question still remains: Why does this radar tracking make the Americans restive?

[Biro] I find it likely that they are not fully certain about the kind of locators that track them. The radio-locators of the air defense forces do not operate in this region. I believe that today we will clarify these issues.

[Levai] Following his visit, Gen. Crouch, commanding general of the U.S. Army, Europe, had said that the security of the military bases has not been completely satisfactory. He thought that it was too easy to enter and leave. What is the view of the Hungarian army leadership about this, and what do you intend to do?

[Biro] In my view, we guard our military installations suitably—in accordance with our regulations. Regret-

fully, because of the construction work at Taszar, a huge amount of building and other materials enter into the barracks area, which we try to control. The costs of fencing off the airport completely are being examined currently, but in my view, the cost of this is so high that we will not be able to undertake it.

[Levai] So what is the solution then?

[Biro] The solution is to tighten checks, and in those areas where the admissions are controlled jointly, the task must be fulfilled with the Americans jointly. [end recording]

NATO Vehicle Accidents Raise Legal Questions

*LD2712224295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. military vehicles have so far caused nine accidents in which Hungarian citizens have suffered [material] losses. There is a development in this matter.

The general secretary of the Hungarian Federation of Insurers has sent a letter to the defense minister because the question of the insurance cover of vehicles belonging to NATO forces stationed in Hungary is unregulated. NATO vehicles do not have compulsory liability cover and there is no government-level agreement regulating this problem either. Insurers are thus meeting Hungarian claims from the domestic compensation fund.

IFOR General Confirms Forces Withdraw on Schedule*AU2812110695 Paris AFP in English
1034 GMT 28 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 28 (AFP) — Bosnian government and Serb forces have withdrawn their forces from key frontline positions in and around Sarajevo in accordance with the Bosnian peace accord, French General Louis Zeller said Thursday.

Zeller, commander of the Sarajevo brigade of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, said the first phase — pulling back from strategic positions — had been carried through.

"Today in Sarajevo we can say that the first phase of the peace accords as signed in Paris on December 14 has been respected," he told a news conference on the frontline Vrbanja bridge here.

The evacuation from 40 positions — bunkers, trenches and buildings — was to have been completed by 2300 GMT Wednesday so IFOR troops could move in. It had been seen as a first test of goodwill by the belligerents after 45 months of devastating conflict in and around the Bosnian capital.

Earlier IFOR spokesman Captain Frederic Solano said that "the two parties withdrew without any problem from the positions designated by IFOR."

The next deadline is January 19, when Serb and government troops are to have pulled back two kilometers (1.25 miles) from the confrontation line, leaving an IFOR-monitored separation zone between them.

Gen Nash, Faction Leaders Meet To Discuss Pact*AU2712153395 Paris AFP in English
1501 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Porebrice, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 27 (AFP) — An American general on Wednesday brought military leaders from all three former warring factions in northeast Bosnia together round a table for a first joint military meeting since the US deployed into Bosnia.

Major General William Nash, the commander of the multinational NATO-led force in northeastern Bosnia, met the military commanders of the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats for an hour and covered implementation of the peace agreement, the identification and removal of mines and freedom of movement for all peoples in the area, a US official said.

Nash declined to speak to reporters at the site but said he would give a report of the meeting later Wednesday.

The meeting, dubbed historic by US officials, took place a few hundred metres (yards) inside Serb-held territory at a bombed-out former roadside guest house once owned by a Bosnian Croat family and now a "potent symbol of the war," said a US official.

A steady snow fall blanketed the road leading to the site, covering fields which US officials said were "probably full of mines."

A few hundred metres (yards) south of the house, its rafters open to the sky, was the first Serb checkpoint.

To the north was a second Serb and then an American barrier and then beyond that, the Sava river.

Trenches bisected the snowy fields.

The Bosnian Croat commander, General Ivan Mamatuzovic, was one of the first to arrive, coming south to the frontline site from his base in the nearby Croat-held Orasje pocket, the scene earlier this year of fierce Serb-Croat fighting.

After him came his Serb counterpart, General Novica Simic, his car marked out from the others by the cyrillic writing on its number plates, his hat a traditional peaked, yellow brimmed Serb hat.

After them came the Bosnian Moslem, Colonel Muharem Efendic, pattering up to the site in a little red Bosnian Army Opel, in place of Bosnian commander General Rasim Delic who did not attend.

Serb soldiers at the checkpoint looked agog as the Bosnian Moslem colonel calmly drove through.

"We spent the night at the house, checking security for this meeting," said a US soldier from the 3rd battalion of the 325th Airborne Combat Team, who had arrived there with other US soldiers Tuesday as part of two small teams setting up security and communications in the area, due to be used within days to transit thousands of US troops into the northern town of Tuzla.

"The Serbs were here last night. One of them came up to us wearing a little American flag on his lapel. We were kind of surprised. We expected them to be hostile," the American said.

Relations between the Serbs and the Americans appear to have improved in recent weeks since a local Serb commander was reported to have ordered a US reconnaissance team out of the nearby town of Bosanski Samac on December 10.

On Tuesday, the commander of the NATO operation, Admiral Leighton Smith, met Serb officials in their

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stronghold of Pale, outside Sarajevo, and said he would consider a delay in the deadline for Serb forces to withdraw from around the Bosnian capital Sarajevo.

With Wednesday's meeting over, the commanders of all three factions came out and shook hands with Nash, and with each other, watched by a crowd of reporters and camera crews.

The commanders then left, the Serb and Croat heading north and the Bosnian Moslem and US general returning south.

Reporters were then allowed to inspect the house where a picture on the wall of a group of Croats eating a meal in green countryside has been defaced by the Serb occupiers — the faces of all the Croats carved out with chisels.

Further on Meeting in Cerik

AU2712203595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Dec 95

[Report by Enes Osmanovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] General William Nash, commander of the U.S. troops in Tuzla, met with Colonel Muharem Efendic, representative of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army; General Matuzovic, representative of the Croatian Defense Council; and Novica Simic, representative of the Serb entity, at the IFOR [Implementation Force] point in Cerik today.

Gen. Nash gave his interlocutors the original text of the Dayton accord in English, as well as the original maps of the cease-fire lines and separation lines. The respect for deadlines set by the accord was requested. It was insisted in particular on the withdrawal of troops to the distance of 2 km at each side of the present cease-fire lines, sources close to IFOR report. The deadline of 30 days from the day IFOR replaced UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] was envisaged for that activity. That deadline, therefore, expires on 19 January.

The removal of all mine fields and mines and explosive obstacles along the roads and in regions of the Federation and Serb entity, as well as the handing over of lists and exchanging prisoners of war, was also discussed.

According to the IFOR plan, a meeting should have been held on removing mines at several points along the Tuzla-Gracanica-Doboj road. Considered above all were the localities of Stanica Rijeka, Porijecina, and Sjenina Rijeka.

Our side has respected the agreement at its section of the territory, but the Serb side has not, using the excuse of bad weather conditions.

The report that the Tuzla-Orasje road is freely used by IFOR was once again confirmed today, we have learned from sources close to IFOR.

Finally, one should direct criticism to so far cooperative Americans for ignoring the domestic media. Transport to the venue of today's meeting was organized for foreign radio and television teams, but representatives of radio and television of Bosnia-Herzegovina have not even been told about it.

Military Commander: War Could Resume 'Next Year'

AU2812123595 Paris AFP in English
1210 GMT 28 Dec 95

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 28 (AFP) — The Bosnian war will resume next year if Bosnian Serbs stop Moslem and Croat refugees returning to their former homes in Serb-held territory, a senior Bosnian Army commander said Thursday [28 December].

"If people from here are not allowed to return home there will be war again next year," the commander of the Bosnian 2nd Corps, General Sead Delic, said in an interview with AFP.

Sitting in his office in central Tuzla, the general said cooperation with NATO forces coming into the region had so far been "good".

But he said he wanted to see NATO forces actually deploying into separation zones that run through the region before he would order his forces to withdraw.

"We have a great chance now for peace and prosperity," said Delic, whose command covers the northern Tuzla region — chosen by US forces for their headquarters for the NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia — up to the Posavina corridor in the north and the Podrinje region in the east.

"But we have to ensure that people are allowed to return to their homes and that war crimes are punished. If that does not happen in this year, then I do not see this peace lasting."

The town of Brcko, currently held by the Bosnian Serbs, should be returned to the Bosnian Moslem-Croat federation, Delic said.

"It will be a big obstacle to peace if the problem of Brcko is not solved."

Delic said the NATO-led Implementation Force [IFOR] had so far made a "good start" in its somewhat slow

deployment into northern Bosnia, and cooperation was "good".

"We have given them a lot of information on logistical situation, traffic-carrying capacity of the roads, on where they can put their troops.

"I have had several meetings with (the US commander of IFOR forces in northeast Bosnia) Major General (William) Nash on implementing the peace agreement.

"The NATO forces have come here to implement the peace agreement. The United Nations, when it was here, could not do that," he said.

We have confidence in NATO, the general said.

Under the Dayton treaty, the Bosnian government and Serb forces should both withdraw two kilometres (1.2 miles) either side of their current frontlines creating a four kilometre (2.5 mile) demilitarised zone to be used to allow refugees and displaced people to cross from one area of the country to another.

"We are ready to withdraw our forces. The only reason we haven't so far is that we are waiting for the IFOR forces to start patrols and move into the space," Delic said.

"When IFOR forces come into those territories we will withdraw.

"Already we are removing mines so IFOR patrols and where they have set up checkpoints we have withdrawn our checkpoints," he said.

Delic also said he had met an American government team of military and economic advisers earlier this month as part of a tour they had undertaken in Bosnia to discuss military and economic aid for Bosnia.

"We have talked to the Americans about helping the Bosnian Army — with guns, armaments and training. We expect to receive this but for the moment we are not receiving assistance in this way," he said.

The commander said meanwhile his troops had since the peace treaty was signed on December 14 seen troops from the Yugoslav army passing through the Posavina corridor back into Serbia.

"We cannot keep an exact watch so I cannot say how many, but we believe some of them are pulling out," he said.

Reporter Views Dangers of Spanish IFOR Mission

BR2812121695 Madrid ABC in Spanish 28 Dec 95
p 31

[Article by Simon Tecco: "Spanish Troops First Ones To Carry Out Mission in Serb-Controlled Area"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana — Very early yesterday morning and under heavy rain, the Spanish patrol unit of the Aragon group was heading for the Bosnian Serb enclave of Nevesinje in the southeast of Bosnia, in the Herzegovina region. Its mission is to clear the road for and guarantee the freedom of movement of the peace accord Implementation Force [IFOR] in this area.

This plan was explained on Tuesday [26 December] in the barracks of the Spanish detachment in Medjugorje at a meeting of the Joint Military Committee with representatives from the three parties to the conflict. The meeting was presided over by Julio Lopez Guarch, chief colonel of the Spanish brigade.

The Spanish deployment started from the cities of Mostar and Stolac, which are controlled by the Bosnians and the Croats, and went in the direction of Nevesinje, a city occupied by Serbian troops located about 40 km from Mostar. It consisted of cavalry and sapper units, a signals corps, a motorized battalion, and a mine clearing unit. Its first task is to carry out reconnaissance missions and clear the way for Spanish engineering units, allowing them, within a few days, to begin their mine tracking and clearing work. Meanwhile, other patrol units will monitor the withdrawal of troops from all sides at the demarcation lines.

So far it is impossible to say which IFOR contingents have been given the most difficult tasks, but it is certain that the Aragon group was not given one of the easier ones. On the contrary, it is a high-risk mission. The mine fields are the first danger with which the Spanish troops will have to cope. Even traveling in BMR [expansion unknown] vehicles is not a guarantee. Hundreds of thousands of mines of various types have been planted along the combat lines, on connecting roads, near energy supply networks, and in other places. In most cases there are no maps outlining the positions of the mines, or they are simply not known because the front line moved so often in one direction or the other. That is why the Spanish armored vehicles moved so cautiously yesterday, using asphalted roads whenever possible. Nevertheless, there were numerous obstacles and the bad weather slowed down the mission even further, lieutenant colonel Ramon Alvarez said.

'Chetnik' Danger

In addition to the risks involved with the move, it has to be taken into account that the Spanish units are the first Western NATO troops to enter Bosnian Serb areas controlled by political and military leaders belonging to the ultranationalist "Chetnik" movement led by Vojislav Seselj. Everybody knows that he is opposed to the peace plan. Its local leader is a person called Bucurovic, a "vojvoda" or "chetnik" chieftain and former truck driver who until recently enjoyed himself by bombing the Dubrovnik area. He is a person whose reactions are unpredictable and abusive and with whom it will be difficult to negotiate. [passage omitted]

Minister Protests Any IFOR Deadline Extension

LD2712231095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, minister in the Government of the Republic-Federation [as heard] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has spoken with Bosnia-Herzegovina television correspondent Jadranko Katanc on the consequences of Admiral Leighton Smith's statement yesterday for further cooperation with the Implementation Force [IFOR] and what steps the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will take.

[Begin recording] [Katanc] Minister, Adm. Leighton Smith last night hinted at the possibility of extending the deadlines. Would you give us the first official comment of the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina Government?

[Muratovic] We were very surprised that Adm. Smith went to Pale and that he negotiated on something that we do not consider to be IFOR business. IFOR should respond to questions "how" and not "what," and we are very afraid that such actions could bring about Akashization [Akasizacija] and UNPROFOR-ization [Unproforizacija] of IFOR.

[Katanc] What steps has the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government taken so far in order to prevent such developments?

[Muratovic] We took diplomatic steps straight away. Today a letter will be dispatched to IFOR, that is to Adm. Smith, in which we will very clearly state our dissatisfaction and, we are sure, the dissatisfaction of the people, and also very clear positions on what we expect from IFOR and Adm. Smith.

[Katanc] If the key deadlines, such as deadlines concerning Sarajevo, are not observed, what will the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina be prepared to undertake?

[Muratovic] We have only one way of reacting to that. That is to demand of the government — whose troops

are obliged to fulfill that part of the task and whose officers are in command of those troops — that it replace them with those who will fulfill that duty. There is no doubt that we will be very consistent in that, and we will not allow the repetition of something we have already been through. [end recording]

Army Warns Against Compromise

AU2712215495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Karadzic's Serbs, who do not want to remain on the territory to be controlled by the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are demanding more time for the transfer of the occupied Sarajevo areas, and are burning houses as they leave. Officials of NATO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reported today that the forces of the Serb aggressor last night set on fire several houses in the areas around Sarajevo, which are to be handed to the legal authorities in accordance with the Dayton agreement. Bosnia-Herzegovina Army officials have also warned that a compromise with the Serb aggressor over the deadline for the transfer of the occupied parts of Sarajevo to the legal authorities would undermine NATO's mission.

Krajisnik Favors Deadline Extension

LD2812002395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2220 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 27 Dec (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, gave the assessment this evening that the talks of the Serb Republic leadership with high-ranking officials of IFOR [Implementation Force], the international community, and international humanitarian organizations are leading toward a solution of all contested issues relating to the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

The speaker of the People's Assembly stressed that the Serb side has informed Carl Bildt, the representative of the international community for the implementation of civilian issues of the Dayton agreement, and also Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of IFOR for former Bosnia, and top officials of the UNHCR and ICRC, of the seriousness of the situation in Serb Sarajevo.

Stressing that with the proposed solution for Sarajevo the international community has not eliminated the cause of the war on the territory of former Bosnia, Krajisnik said in a special program on Serb Republic television that the future of the entire Dayton agreement and peace in general are dependent on the best solution for Sarajevo.

Noting that agreement was reached with the Muslim side that particular disputed areas, apart from Sarajevo, should be resolved in bilateral negotiations, speaker Krajisnik stressed that the representatives of the international community, IFOR, and international humanitarian organizations have been asked to devote particular attention to solving the problems in Serb Sarajevo.

According to Krajisnik, the Serb side called on Bildt and Smith to propose a solution by 30 January at the latest which would ensure the security of the Serb population in Serb Sarajevo, not excluding the possibility that the deadline for implementation in this area, in accordance with the authority of Bildt and Smith, be extended.

Noting that the Serbs do not want a change in the Dayton agreement, but sufficient time for its implementation, Krajisnik stressed that the Serb side has asked for the envisaged deadline of three months to be extended, which would, as the speaker of the Serb Republic parliament said, allow for new and better solutions.

Stressing that the Serbs do not want to leave Serb Sarajevo, but that they also do not want to surrender it to the Muslims, speaker Krajisnik warned that the international community must find a solution which would be acceptable to the Serbs. [passage omitted]

Krajisnik said that in the event of a negative response from the U.S. Admiral, the situation in Sarajevo could get out of control.

"There is a danger of uncontrolled actions as all means of legitimate struggle have been exhausted," speaker Krajisnik said.

According to the speaker of the People's Assembly, the world will not accept Sarajevo as an ethnically pure city. "That is why I am sure that the Muslims will also agree to negotiations on a different solution," Krajisnik said.

He appealed again to the citizens of Serb Sarajevo not to leave, stressing that the state has an evacuation plan ready in the event that a satisfactory solution is not found.

"If the people find strength to endure this last battle, we will win," the speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic concluded.

Hadzici Serbs Pressured To Leave by Authorities

AU2712211395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Dec 95

[Report by Jadranka Milosevic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Life in the free territory of Hadzici Municipality is fully normalized, almost as in peacetime. The situation in the Hadzici part under Serb

control is much more interesting. According to our data and confirmed by Army sources as well, the local Serb authorities from Hadzici have been very active over the last 10 days. Irrespective of the constant appeals issued by the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities to all Serbs who did not commit war crimes to remain on their land, the Hadzici Serbs, under pressure from their authorities, are preparing themselves to leave for the Serb entity. As a part of these activities, their army has recently set on fire two storehouses with military equipment in Zunovica barracks. A gas station and the Zlevina facility, which until recently housed a kitchen and soldiers' dormitories, have been destroyed.

We learned from the same sources that the local Serb authorities have been forcing their population to flee from Hadzici and the villages nearby. Before that, they would sell their belongings at very low prices at the market in the village of Azapovici near Kiseljak. They would sell cattle, household appliances, and agricultural machinery. They are using the money earned that way mostly to buy oil and gasoline. Apart from that, it often happens that, embittered for having to leave Hadzici, the Serbs are destroying their houses and setting them on fire.

Karadzic: Accord 'Best Solution' to Conflict

LD2712215795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2048 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 27 Dec (SRNA) — Serb Republic President Dr. Radovan Karadzic has assessed that the Dayton agreement, despite weaknesses with regard to the division of territory, is the best solution offered so far for regulating the conflict in former Bosnia.

In an interview for the latest edition of the Kragujevac newspaper POGLEDI [VIEWS], President Karadzic said that the most important result of the Dayton-Paris summit was the recognition of the statehood of the Serb Republic, to which is guaranteed by constitutional provisions the possibility of blocking the adoption of any decisions which would destroy the results of the struggle of the Serb nation.

With the constitution of the Serb Republic, Dr. Karadzic says, Serbia was also saved from destruction, because "in 1992 there was a danger of war breaking out in Kosovo."

On the future of the Serb Republic, President Karadzic stressed that it will not suffer the fate of the Republic of Serb Krajina, despite the fact that there are those who, as he put it, "will endeavor to sow hatred in the political structures and jeopardize the state's authority."

"The Serb Republic will consolidate its authority from within, by establishing a competent government and the rule of law. Our laws should be strict and the people who implement them should be honest and tolerant," President Karadzic stressed in the interview to POGLEDI.

Paper Condemns U.S. Pragmatism Over Principles

AU2712180595 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian)
in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Pirolic: "Democracy Above All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Milutinovic, foreign minister of the latest Yugoslavia, will be among the foreign visitors preparing to visit Sarajevo next month. Only a month ago, that would have been a sensation of international proportions. In January it will be a sign that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the new Yugoslavia is entering the final stage.

Minister Milutinovic, former ambassador to Athens, is a close friend of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic from the days when the leader of Serbia was only a successful banker. Could his visit be an introduction into something that seems unthinkable even today — Milosevic's visit to Sarajevo? Suspicions have not been dispersed here (what is more, they are very alive in some circles) that the Serbian leadership has still not given up the greater Serbia project. Milosevic has not recognized Croatia because he does not want eastern Slavonia and Prevlaka within its borders. Things are different with Bosnia. A Serb statelet has been created of a size acceptable to the world, within borders "that can be defended by Serb guns." As early as tomorrow, a leadership completely loyal to Belgrade could be installed in this statelet, which is formally still a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the other hand, it is clear whom the leadership of the Herzegovina — if not the Bosnian — Croats obeys. It would be unfair to accuse the creators of the Dayton agreement of sowing seeds of future discord in their solution for Bosnia, but the way things stand now, not a single key decision in this country will be made without the will of Belgrade and Zagreb. The essence of Bosnia is not only in tolerance but also in the delicate balance among its three nations, which has always been disrupted at times of war and great crises. In Bosnia's best days the political leaderships of its three nations were turned toward Sarajevo. It is highly uncertain when that will be the case again.

It is not likely that the founder fathers from Dayton did not understand what kind of a state they were

creating, and what elements of destabilization it carried within. If the arrival of the powerful NATO forces ("that meanest dog in town") means that the world does not want the war to break out again in Bosnia, then the thick web being woven around this country by the most powerful political and economic institutions speaks of the intention of placing Bosnia on its own two feet as soon as possible. This country has come to the point of being admitted into the IMF in record time. There is almost no obstacle to membership in European institutions. Immediately after Dayton, Bosnia was admitted into FIFA, that conservative football association, which is infallible in assessing whether a future member might cause it political problems.

The Bosnian solution, according to Dayton, opens the question of how the most powerful countries plan to solve the other problems caused by the disintegration of the SFRY. The idea of a creation of some new federal state in the Balkans at the moment does not have many supporters, while on the ground this idea stands absolutely no chance. The Dayton agreement might have resembled the start of the Scandinavianization of the Balkans, had not a serious mistake been made at the beginning. The Scandinavian model implies the creation of democratic national states with the highest respect for human rights, and borders that are completely open to movement of people and ideas. In Dayton two undemocratic regimes were appointed godfathers in the ceremony of the birth of a new country, which is also democratic only on paper.

The question of democracy is certainly the key question for Bosnia and the stability in the entire region, but the Americans gave Milosevic's regime a new legitimacy in Dayton. What we saw in Paris resembled a scene from political science fiction: U.S. President Bill Clinton shook hands heartily with Milosevic, and then held political talks with him. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, often likened to the Serbian leader in the United States, has never been thus honored. Political pragmatism defeated principles, which is happening all too frequently with the United States. We will experience in our lives and our futures the possibility of the existence of a democratic Bosnia with the east and west neighbors being what they are, with nationalistic-populist parties determining even here the framework of democracy.

However, so as things do not run completely out of control, the world is there holding Bosnia firmly in its hands. Carl Bildt, the political governor, and Leighton Smith, the military governor, are only two of the important people making sure that things do not go wrong in Bosnia. The rest of them are in the IMF, the

World Bank, the EU, NATO, the European Council, and dozens of other similar organizations.

Herzeg-Bosnia Official on Federation's Future

AU2712211195 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Herzeg-Bosnia official Ante Markotic by Gorden Knezovic; place and date not given: "We Stand a Chance Only on Our Own Territory"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Before the war, Ante Markotic worked at the Economic Faculty in Sarajevo, and was an expert of the scientific fund of Bosnia-Herzegovina for demography of the population and economic development. After the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, he became an expert adviser in the presidential cabinet and the cabinet of the presidential council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. He participated in the negotiations on the arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina in London, Geneva, and Vienna, and is one of the co-authors of the Vance-Owen plan.

[Knezovic] What do you think about the new borders of the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in view of the pre-war national structure of the population?

[Markotic] Although they have still not been precisely defined, either on paper or on the terrain, it can already be said that those borders have never been clearer, ethnically cleaner, even in the Croat-Muslim federation. Namely, the Bosnia that people remember does not exist anymore, and it is hardly probable that it ever will exist again. Whether Bosnia has been made "cleaner" or "dirtier" through this war is hard to say. Realistically, the borders have been created among the peoples here. [passage omitted]

The Disappearing People

[Markotic] In the modern process of the "emerging state" and "disappearing people," I would nostalgically characterize the near future of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the sentence "on their own territory but without their own people." (The young people have gone to the cities of Croatia and Europe, and the older people to the "new" cemeteries in their new places of residence).

[Knezovic] The new borders of the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina call for a new legal and political internal arrangement. Which criteria would have to be recognized in that?

[Markotic] In the internal arrangement, it is the national criteria that should be respected in the first place. It sounds like an ordinary phrase, but all other issues are unimportant or less important than this one. The national

issue is not there for its own sake, but here it is no longer possible to push it into the background.

Unfortunately, many people who think, talk, or write about Bosnia — who, what is worse, influence capital decisions or make them — know little or nothing about Bosnia. Their intellectual abilities cannot comprehend that the people from Ljubusko have no interest in "liberating" Foca, those from Trnovo have no interest in Focusje, those from Cazin have no interest in Bileca; whereas the people from Nevesinje would very gladly "liberate" Grude. Integrity and unity can only mean a community here. Sovereign and constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina are different than the sovereign and constituent Americans in the United States, or the French people in France.

Many approve of the vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who will "burn out Herzeg-Bosnia," and few people know that until this war he was not even a citizen of the thousand-year-old country of Herzeg-Bosnian ancestors. And how can one possibly accept the former chief commander of the Muslim army, and before that the head of the "Patriotic League of Bosnia-Herzegovina," who was born in Sandzak and did not even live in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war, and who is accused by Croatia to have destroyed Croat towns, and who will most probably have to face the Hague tribunal because of his war crimes against Croats in central Bosnia and northern Herzegovina? All attempts to simplify Bosnia have a dear price.

Destabilization of the Croat Being

[Knezovic] Is Bosnia-Herzegovina possible?

[Markotic] After all that has happened, I often ask myself whether Bosnia-Herzegovina has any meaning at all. Many voices which express their belief in that come from the outside rather than the inside, from a distance rather than from somewhere near. Many doubt in the ability of the Dayton Bosnia to function at all, many negate that possibility. The federal entity has no rosy perspectives either.

The federation of Croats and Muslims, but not the territory on which they live together, seems to be the embryo of destabilization of the Croatian national being. Those two cultures are incompatible and they can hardly be joined by the common territory. The war, victims, and opposed political conceptions and vanities, and particularly the numerical predominance, or rather the atmosphere of anxiety and inequality, will cause the withdrawal of the smaller group and its conscious suppression.

Croatians insisting on equality will be declared as a lack of compliance with the new state, and we will

be accused before the world and before Croatia. That could be the course of events, of our disappearance from these territories, and we the Croats are not aware of that sufficiently, by no means as aware as our federal partner and the "Serbian Republic."

Only Croats who are on their own territory have a chance, and that is possible only if we now ask for the right to create a Muslim state. Tomorrow it will be too late for us, because we will leave, and for the Muslims it will be just right because they will get what the "world" allegedly does not want to allow today. If we are not aware of that, in the future Serbs and Muslims will demand to have an exit to the coast, from Boka [Boka Kotorska Bay] to Tvrtko's [famous Bosnian king] town of Zadar.

Bosnian Croat Position in Federation Analyzed
AU2812103895 Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian
14 Dec 95 pp 10-11

[Article by Fadil Mandal: "All Croatian Crossroads"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Dayton agreement does not suit the interests of the Croatian people as a whole, particularly not in Bosnia-Herzegovina." The president of the federation, Kresimir Zubak, reiterated this attitude to the outcome of the peace talks in Ohio before the delegates in the house of representatives of the Croat Republic of "Herzeg-Bosnia" at its session last week. In this way, the current top man in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at least partially denied the speculations of the political lobbies in the last few days about his alleged comeback on old positions, the positions of carrying out the orders and tasks from Zagreb without objection.

It would be politically naive, of course, to believe that such a development on the internal Croatian scene necessarily implies the break-up of the two policies, until now identical and unique: namely, the policy of the Croatian state regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croat national policy within Bosnia-Herzegovina. At this time, it would be more correct to talk about certain tactical moves (under pressure from the international community), and about personal discord on a level that can by no means result in a breakup.

Political Cosmetics

Instead of Dario Kordic, accused of war crimes committed in the valley of the Lasva River, the post of the president of the strongest Croat party in Bosnia has been taken by Ivo Lozancic, a confirmed follower of the Zagreb leadership, a man who, as the commander of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of Zepce, is well remembered by the Bosniak population of that town, and

that because of similar sort of "improprieties" that sent his predecessor from Busovaca [Dario Kordic] on a trip to The Hague.

Lozancic's first statements after taking office, in which he still talked about "Herzeg-Bosnia" even after 20 December — the date until which all the arrangements of that para-state fabrication had to be gradually eliminated, and to give way to the federation and the federal government — additionally justify the opinions of those who believe that the new names and new people on the Bosnian political stage are nothing but cosmetic changes.

The situation is somewhat more complex when it comes to the announced change in the post of federal president — both in the political sense and in terms of general references concerning the persons who might replace him.

Judging by their moves up to now, neither Zubak nor his possible successor Vladimir Soljic can be said to be independent of the will and orders of President Tudjman, who, whether the people in Sarajevo like it or not, is the inspirer and commander of all important political moves of Croats in Bosnia.

The fact that Soljic has recently also become a representative in the Croatian Assembly additionally stresses his complete dependence on the Father of the Nation [Tudjman]. After all, he brought him to the desks of the Assembly, just as previously he put him in the place of the defense minister in the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

Where, then, lies the complexity of the situation, which, at first sight, is quite clear and recognizable?

First, it can be seen in the fact that the cited personal change at the head of the federation is not completely certain. Our source, close to circles acquainted with developments in the Croat political leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been convincing us that Zubak's departure is not all that certain. It is quite possible, our source claims, that Zubak will remain in that post, with an undertaking to curb his criticism of the Dayton agreement.

The Merciless "Accomplished Fact"

In the opinion of some leading Croat politicians, it would thus be possible to reconcile the two concepts, which are opposed only in appearance. Zubak, as an advocate of the changes in the Dayton agreement, would remain in the post of the president of the Federation. The justified revolt of the Croats from Bosanska Posavina would be amortized with the hope that the one who fought for their rights in Dayton will still be able to do

something about changing that agreement. The Zagreb leader would be able to chalk up that democratic move on his political account, which he needs because of the present internal situation in Croatia.

In the meantime — those who are in favor of such a solution believe — the anger of the displaced population will abate, NATO will implement the agreement without any changes, and when the "deceit" is realized, both the people and the political leadership will be able to defend themselves or to console themselves with the mercilessness of the "accomplished fact."

Even if this scenario comes about, the Bosniak-Croat relationships, the relationship of Croats towards the federation and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the policy of exclusive patronage of Zagreb over Grude, will not suffer any bigger, essential changes.

A number of examples from the near and distant past illustrate that, and some very recent examples simply confirm it. "In relation to the will to preserve Bosnia as a unified state, one can say that it is the least suitable solution for all sides," Vladislav Pogarcic, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, claimed recently. Of course he did not clarify that it was Zagreb and Belgrade that were trying to carry out that sort of policy, through their satellites in Bosnia, because if he had clarified it, the real intentions and messages of such statements would be disclosed.

The fact that the wishes of the Bosniak people are identified with those of the others (whereas they are absolutely clear and oriented toward the unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina) has to do with the deputy minister's "cunning" and political impertinence.

"All the Rights — and No Responsibilities"

At around the same time, NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA published the words of Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, who stated that "by securing the status of Sarajevo as a unified city (through the Dayton agreement — remark by the author), the conditions are created for Croats to organize a municipality of their own on the territory of Stup [part of town]."

It is indicative that this attitude appeared precisely at the time when the Serbs from the parts of town that are to be returned under the federal jurisdiction, among others, also demand municipalities that would be exclusively their own, with the national sign and rule, regardless of the results of 1990 elections.

Ivan Vidovic, president of the City Board of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Sarajevo, whom we asked to comment on Granic's words, said:

"It is true that we want a municipality in Stup, a territory where Croats were a majority before the war, and we will carry out our request in accordance with the federal constitution and the law on local self-rule." It remains to be seen whether the possible creation of the Croat municipality of Stup will really be performed according to the procedure mentioned by Mr. Vidovic.

The recently held panel discussion "Croats in Sarajevo," and the discussions that could be heard there, anticipate some wider plans of the future actions of Croats here.

The above-mentioned examples sufficiently portray the further intentions of Croatian policy towards Bosnia altogether; they can be plastically expressed in the phrase "all rights, but no responsibilities." Even the things done lately by the Croat People's Council [HNV] and its president Ivo Komsic [member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] only blur the essence of the problem. Their political actions, and not only theirs, are sometimes directed to wrong addresses and wrong people. The HNV would want to conduct a pro-Bosnian policy of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but at the same time it asks for the support of those — including President Tudjman — who have completely different plans regarding the survival of the Bosnian state.

Even when things are stripped naked, as they are in the case of Bosanska Posavina, the blame is put on the other side and not where it should be, among the Croats themselves. If one wants to influence a wrong policy, as the HDZ policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly is, then one has to impose a strong alternative to it. There is no such alternative among the Croat people in this moment.

Fierce Political Struggle

The future of this people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is questionable — no matter how illusory it is at this time to try to prove that to the passionate followers of the dream of Greater Croatia. Kresimir Zubak claims that "with the proposed peace solution, the Croat people will be left without a great number of their members, and without them it will be hard to realize the rights and interests on the territories on which the Croats were a majority, or mixed."

In their evaluations of the prospects for the Croats and their policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some analysts even go one step further. Thus, in their opinion, Bosnian Croats will have to face a fierce political struggle for survival on the territory that they now inhabit. Those who are to blame for this position of theirs, according to these analyses, can be found in the Zagreb presidential residence, and in Grude.

On the other hand, the destiny of the Herzegovina Croats is not that bleak. Mirjana Kasapovic, sociology professor at Zagreb University, foresees their role as that of a Croatian Krajina, in the area bordering the Dalmatian coast. Judging by the attitudes they advocate today, which are dominant in the political will of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina altogether, they would have nothing against such future.

Among the Croat people there are certainly some political figures who are aware of these bad tendencies. But since they are lonely on the road that leads to securing the full equality of Croats in Bosnia with legal and legitimate means, the time when such politicians will predominate cannot be expected to come very soon.

Those who create Croatian policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and within Bosnia-Herzegovina today, still cannot, or do not want to, admit to themselves that they have reached the crossroads. One road leads to uncertainty, the other to equality and a secure life in the state of which Croats have always been an integral part.

The decision on the direction that should be taken is not hard. What is hard in this moment is hard to remove those who are pointing in the wrong one.

[Box, p 10]

Kordic and Blaskic Will Be Defended by Tudjman's Lawyer in The Hague

The events that followed the indictment of Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic [commanders of the Croatian Defense Council] before the International Tribunal for War Crimes in The Hague shows that the regime in Zagreb stands to the end behind the people who carried out its policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Namely, as the Zagreb paper NACIONAL reports, immediately after he found out that his favorites had been "invited" to The Hague, President Tudjman brought the best Croatian lawyer to his office and proposed that he take over the organization of their defense. At the same time that was a signal for the patrons of the Croatian state and policy in the world, which was to show that their requests for Croatia's cooperation with the international tribunal will be satisfied.

Croat-Muslim Mostar Commission Reaches 'Deadlock'

*LD2712211795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The commission for drafting the statute of the town of Mostar and drawing up the demarcation lines between Croat and Muslim municipalities concluded its work today. The commission has not

achieved a result with regard to a solution, and we discuss the reasons for this with the news bulletin guest, Boro Puljic, vice president of the municipal council of Mostar and member of the commission.

Mr. Puljic, how long have these negotiations and the work of the commission been going on?

[Puljic] We have been talking for a month in the commission about the future organization of the town of Mostar. We have achieved some results. However, we have reached an absolute deadlock as far as future negotiations are concerned. Today we had the last meeting of the commission; tomorrow there will be a meeting of the council of the EU administration, and we find ourselves in a stalemate.

[Unidentified correspondent] How did this stalemate come about? Were the positions of the Croat and Muslim sides so far apart, so contradictory, that it was not possible to work out at least a compromise solution?

[Puljic] The situation is clear. In Dayton, a global framework of the future arrangement for the town of Mostar was worked out. On the basis of this global framework it was agreed that a statute, a transitional statute for the town of Mostar, should be negotiated, then a decree would be issued on future elections, and delineation maps worked out for three plus three municipalities — maps of the six future municipalities which will make up the town of Mostar.

We embarked on the task, and we have succeeded in bringing the work on the statute to a conclusion, despite varying problems. Likewise with the decree, we were able to find some compromise solutions. In other words, we found a form of future coexistence, a permanent coexistence in this town, the form... [changes thought] We found a solution that would have enabled both peace and coexistence in a way that would eliminate all future conflicts.

However, when we reached the problem of the maps, the Muslim side has so far made three or four proposals. First, we put forward our proposal at the very beginning and we have stood by it. We simply put it forward for discussion. However, the Muslim side has — contrary to the principle agreement on three Croat, three Muslim municipalities — suggested a plan that has three Muslim, one Serb, and two Croat municipalities, which is in absolute contradiction to the Dayton Agreement — perhaps not the Dayton Agreement, but to the verbal agreement made here, in public, in front of many people, etc.

Later, they came out with a proposal which again did not comply; it has four Muslim and two Croat

municipalities, which again is not three-three. That again confuses all the relations.

Today, they submitted their final proposal. Today we have the definitive proposal of three Muslim municipalities, but with a Muslim majority, I would say, not even in percentages, but in fractions of percentages, a proposal which allows them absolute supremacy, dominance in this town, and you know how any attempt to dominate ends. However, there are other things at issue here.

The Muslim side is aware that there is a situation to be gained. It hopes that someone else will untie the knot and reach a solution without us. The Muslim side has intentionally proposed some unrealistic solutions. Solutions so unrealistic that we will not even discuss them. They have been doing this for a month in order to bring us to a situation of deadlock, so that someone else then has to decide.

We have seen through this proposal from the very beginning, and at the very beginning we said that any decree, any form of imposition on such an important national question such as the organization of future municipalities, is out of the question.

Daily Comments on Problems With Mujahidin in Zenica

AU2712221695 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 95 p 5

[Article by Sead Numanovic: "Mujahidin Going Home"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The murder of five high-level people of the "El Mujahid" Unit in Zepce, a car bomb planted in front of the Unit's command near the Zenica Steelworks, killing one member of the formation and seriously wounding five, and the death of Elvedin Hodzic, a Bosniak member of the "El Mujahid" unit killed by British UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) contingent members in front of his house door near Donji Vakuf, have thoroughly focused the attention of not only our but also the foreign public on the only foreign formation within the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The presence of foreign soldiers is a normal phenomenon in any war. In principle, they are organized in smaller or bigger military formations of an offensive character, and are there as long as the reason of their existence is there — the war. They go to war for either material (mercenaries) or ideological reasons. We all remember how the former regime was very proud of the fact that as early as the times of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a large number of communists was engaged in the international brigades in the war in Spain.

Deliberate Self-Sacrifice

According to all relevant estimates, there are about 1,000 foreign soldiers fighting in the ranks of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and about one-third of them is concentrated in the "El Mujahid" Unit. They are very well-equipped, possess a strong internal organization, and are closed off against almost everybody outside the Unit. Members are being recruited on the principle of volunteering, and most of them are Bosniak. In recent times there have been increasingly more Europeans who accepted Islam and who joined the unit to fight. The most influential members are of Afro-Asian origin and include experienced warriors, intellectuals, and businessmen.

During almost four years of its presence in the region, "El Mujahid" was not the unit to cause the greatest problems. They did not always fit into something called the line of guiding and commanding for many reasons, ranging from distrust to communications problems.

As for fighting, some of their actions were of the kind that curdles the blood on our side — imagine a large group of soldiers setting off toward the enemy with the cry "Allakhu ekber" and moving toward the enemy regardless of casualties. However, nobody can accept their explanation for more than insolent behavior in the street, when they brutally separate young men and women who walk holding each other's hands or attack women who are "dressed too liberally" (according to their taste).

People who do not know the situation among the mujahidin could think that such behavior was generated by the Unit's command and the powerful sponsors backing it, but that is not the case. It is known that the Unit's command has always opposed such behavior, and some people in fact say that in such conduct at public places, the main role was played not by people of Afro-Asian, but Bosniak origin.

Anyhow, whoever caused problems in public places faced strict punishment. One of them is, for instance, that prisoners were given nettles for bedspreads and their daily meal was boiled down to a handful of dates and a piece of bread. The mujahidin are strict only toward their soldiers who behave in a non-Muslim way (according to their concept), so there have been examples of their imprisoning young men caught standing together with girls. It may sound as exaggeration, but is true.

Western Fears

The mujahidin found themselves under public attack when some of their members threatened that they would

not sit idle if NATO soldiers arrive in Bosnia. After many unpleasant experiences with interventions, the Americans now decided to reduce any possible risk to the lowest possible extent, so in that respect, before this mission they studied well who and what side could present any danger. In the case of Bosnia, these are (for the time being) the mujahidin alone.

Reasons for that do not primarily lie in concrete actions against the Americans, that is, Westerners in general, but in the general Western perception of Arabs as "terrorists and fundamentalists from whom all the evil of this world comes," including terrorism in particular. To be specific, there have been several threats that the mujahidin directed to foreigners, although there are no tangible proofs that any offenses, apart from verbal ones, resulted from these threats.

A U.S. citizen was found dead in Tuzla recently, and two Brits were kidnapped. This was connected with the sudden appearance of a small group of mujahidin near Tuzla. Investigation has still not established who is to blame, but the mujahidin have already been condemned by the Western media. Moreover, after the British UN soldiers clashed with the mujahidin, all Western humanitarian organizations withdrew from Zenica out of security reasons, although the mujahidin did not do anything.

They did threaten a U.S. official in Zenica, so that he spent a restless night in the Turkish Battalion command at the Steelworks and left this largest town of central Bosnia early in the morning.

The Croats and Bosniaks in Zenica are now very vociferously complaining about mujahidin behavior. The difference lies in the fact that the Croats ultimately demand that the unit leave the part of Zenica where it is located, and that the Bosniaks only want the mujahidin to mind their own business.

Bosnian Experience

The Western attacks against the unit are in many ways unfounded and insulting. The Americans know a lot about the mujahidin in Bosnia, which shows that they were interested in them before and had a certain reason for the interest. The Bosniaks did not have experience with mujahidin of the kind they had with some Bosniak units (the units of Caco, Celo....), nor will they have it, if it depended on El Mujahid alone. They have spilled enough blood, to be ready to spit on their own dead. After all, the Bosnian state is strong enough not to allow an Afghan case to be repeated in Bosnia.

The mujahidin will leave Bosnia. This is beyond any doubt, particularly in the wake of all these incidents. However, the Bosnian state is obliged and indebted to

all people who fought for it when everything was so hopeless. There is another question with a special weight which is constantly there — are the mujahidin the only obstacle?

LBO Chair Urges Formation of 'Democratic Forces'

AU2612161095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Dec 95

[Report on news conference by Muhamed Filipovic, chairman of the Liberal Bosniak Organization and Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Great Britain, in Sarajevo on 26 December by Stevo Latinovic — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Latinovic] The Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] and I personally have already made it clear that we believe that what the Dayton agreement is asking from Bosnia-Herzegovina is unfavorable to it, Mr. Filipovic said, explaining why:

[Filipovic] First of all, because of the acceptance of the establishment of a Serb state on the territory of Bosnia, and secondly because of the acceptance that half the state territory should be placed under the control of the so-called Serb state, that is, the acceptance that regions in which the Bosniaks and Croats were in the majority should be turned into Serb territories.

[Latinovic] Should the agreement have been accepted?

[Filipovic] My party and I do not intend to oppose the Dayton agreement in any way. On the contrary, we intend to become engaged in a full and complete implementation of the agreement. We see faults in the agreement, but also very significant chances for the reintegration of Bosnia, and for the creation of a democratic, secular, and multilateral common state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we believe that it is very significant that all the forces that favor such an outcome should unite politically, and fight at the next elections for the affirmation and acceptance of the platform for the unified, secular, democratic, and multilateral Bosnia. These democratic forces will need to win at least 35 percent of the vote, which will give them the possibility to block and thwart all the moves that would lead to a permanent [word indistinct] of the imposed ethnic and national division of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, and the creation of one-nation entities on its territory. My party and I personally will fight for the formation of such a force.

[Latinovic] Mr. Filipovic stressed that he and his party had already established contacts with people of democratic inclinations in Banja Luka, which gave hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina would manage one day to

establish a civic democratic society in its entire territory.
[passage omitted]

Kljuic Criticizes TV Policy, Urges Ration Cards

*AU2112172295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Stjepan Kljuic, president of the Republican Party, held a news conference today at which he informed the correspondents present about the views and the goals of this party.

As Mr. Kljuic said, two months ago, the Republican Party demanded that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government issue an arrest warrant for Fikret Abdic, a demand to which it has not received any reply yet.

The second thing championed by the Republican Party, according to Kljuic, is the introduction of ration cards for food and clothing to the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens.

The third demand of the Republican Party is the lifting of the media blockade. Here, Kljuic voiced his dissatisfaction with the Television Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, according to him, is the ruling medium in Bosnia-Herzegovina and which is exercising a selective information policy.

Serb Opposition Party Welcomes Peace Accord

*LD1512194695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1504 GMT 15 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 15 Dec (TANJUG) — The Socialist Party of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [SPRS] stated today that the signing of the peace agreement in Paris "marks the end of the suffering of all kinds and the international isolation of the Serb people."

A statement from the executive committee of the main committee of the SPRS notes that this was achieved "thanks to the persistent and principled policies created and realized by President Milosevic."

The statement adds that with the Paris agreement "the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have achieved the legitimate right to their own state territory in which they will live in freedom and equality with ties with their motherland in all areas of life and work in accordance with their own interests."

The SPRS notes that great sacrifices were made for this goal, which make it an obligation to behave rationally in the future and prove "national maturity and historical responsibility."

The peace agreement is "the first, but hardest step in establishing mutual trust between the sides, which were until yesterday at war, and it is burdened with fear and

hatred," the SPRS says, adding that in this "the unbiased attitude of international factors, which we justifiably expect, will play a decisive role."

The SPRS calls on the current authorities in the Serb Republic to "stop focusing on themselves," and states that "if they wish to avoid social unrest, to direct all their energy into caring for the refugee population, getting the economy on its feet, and preparing industry for the return of workers from the battlefields, and ensuring heating in hospitals, kindergartens, schools, and university faculties."

The statement concludes with the readiness of the SPRS "to make a full contribution to these efforts."

Serbs Accuse Muslims at Hague War Crimes Tribunal

*LD1612185095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1401 GMT 16 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Dec (SRNA) — Representatives of the Association of Prisoners of 1991-1993 from the Celebici camp returned today from The Hague, where they had been giving evidence at the International War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia on crimes of Muslims against Serbs in this camp.

These former prisoners gave evidence at the international Tribunal in The Hague that during their imprisonment the Celebici camp was visited in mid-July 1992 by Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

"Izetbegovic did not come to see the prisoners, but a huge arsenal of arms and ammunition hidden in the camp," one of the former prisoners told SRNA.

"The arms and ammunition for the Muslims were delivered by the International Red Cross, and we unloaded it," another witness testified.

The investigators at the Hague tribunal, who have been systematically registering all camps on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, heard the day before yesterday the testimony of one woman and two men, who also handed them a list of war criminals from Celebici.

"There were over 400 prisoners in the camp who were imprisoned by the Muslims without indictment or warrants. I was raped together with six other women," testified a former female prisoner of this notorious camp.

The former prisoners say that the worst thing was the sexual torture, raping of prisoners and those who came to visit them.

The investigators of the Hague tribunal have recorded all incidents of ethnic cleansing in the village of

Bradina, near Konjic, where almost 1,000 Serbs used to live.

Banja Luka Serbs Sentence SDA, Merhamet Members

AU2712164995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb aggressor authorities are still refusing to liberate or exchange 11 leading personalities of Merhamet [humanitarian organization] from Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Sanski Most who were arrested on 28 February this year. The aggressor authorities have already sentenced to long prison terms six members of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in Banja Luka. This information has been supplied by this municipality's presidency in exile. Nada al-Issa has the details:

[Al-Issa] The indictment against the arrested Merhamet members was filed at the Banja Luka Military Court, although all these people are civilians. They are charged with espionage and antistate activity because they cooperated with the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, Merhamet, the International Red Cross, and other humanitarian organizations. This is literally the way the indictment reads. The exchange of these people has been agreed on several occasions, but the aggressor authorities would always change the conditions for an exchange at the last moment.

The arrested are mostly elderly and ill people. Some of them were taken to prison directly from their sickbed. We have the names of the arrested people. They are the president, vice president, secretary, and members of the Main Committee of the Banja Luka Merhamet: Nijaz Karaselimovic, Peco Filipovic, Ismet Felah, Agil Medic, and Enver Ibrahimbegovic.

The following are members of the Prijedor Merhamet: Nijaz Kapetanovic, Agil Colo, and (Kadifa Feric), mother of three underage children. The arrested members of the Sanski Most Merhamet are Hursida Alagic and Amir Salic.

When the aggressor authorities intend to put these people on trial remains unknown, as the trial has been postponed several times.

However, six members of the Banja Luka SDA have already been sentenced to long prison terms. Their names are: Safet Filipovic, Smail Cuzel, Sukreta Cuzel, Asim Jakirlic, Dziahudin Smailagic, and Osman Gotic. They were arrested in August 1994 and recently sentenced to high prison sentences, some of them up to 20 years.

Therefore, representatives of the Merhamet and municipality of Banja Luka in exile demand that influence be exerted on the international community and international humanitarian organizations to have all arrested people released, the presence of European observers ensured for possible trials, access to all arrested made possible, and, which is most important, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague informed of this.

Banja Luka Croat Bishop Freed From House Arrest

AU2212181595 Paris AFP in English 1649 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 22 (AFP) — The Catholic bishop in Serb-held Banja Luka, Cardinal Franjo Komarica, has been freed from house arrest, local Bosnian radio reported Friday.

Komarica, a Croat who remained in the Bosnian Serb stronghold in northern Bosnia throughout the war, had been confined to home for 231 days, official Bosnian radio said.

As a leading figure of northern Bosnia's Croat community the bishop was regarded with suspicion by the extremist Serb authorities in Banja Luka. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1992, Serb paramilitary and police forces have waged a violent campaign to "ethnically cleanse" the area of non-Serbs.

The radio reported that Komarica visited the site of a mosque destroyed in May in retaliation for a Croat government army offensive on rebel Serb enclaves in Croatia and the graves of three friars killed during the war.

"Bishop Komarica prayed for all victims of the war and innocent victims, priests, friars and for all those expelled from his diocese," the radio said.

Muslim Iman Assaulted, Arrested in Croat Mostar

LD2312174295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of Elders of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has lodged a protest with Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, the leaders of the [Muslim-Croat] Federation, and Hans Koschnick, the head of the EU administration in Mostar, over the arrest and the maltreatment of Muhamed Efendi Alihodzic.

Imam Alihodzic was in Mostar for a pre-Ramadan meeting of imams from the Bosnian diaspora. He was assaulted after his private belongings were searched and a photograph found showing Imam Alihodzic in his

official Islamic clothes. Other policemen pointed their guns at him while he was assaulted. The incident took place in [Bosnian Croat-held] western Mostar.

The protest says that the act of brutal physical violence cannot be treated as an isolated case. The most responsible officials of the Federation are called upon to bring the culprit and his accomplices to justice after an investigation. Copies of the letter have been sent to Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the State Presidency, Cardinals Franjo Kuharic and Vinko Puljic, and the ambassadors of the United States, Germany, and Croatia.

TANJUG Views Plight of Croat, Muslim Refugees

*LD2112160095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1226 GMT 21 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 21 (TANJUG) — The Croat authorities of the town of Jajce, central Bosnia, have said that Muslim refugees could return there on condition that Croats expelled from the town of Bugojno are allowed to come back, the Croatian Radio said on Thursday.

The radio said that the Muslim authorities have not allowed Croats to return to their homes and apartments, abandoned in mid-September by about 3,000 Muslim families who had found temporary accommodation there and who returned to Donji Vakuf.

Muslim Sarajevo Radio said that a group of international monitors, who were in Jajce on Wednesday, had failed to convince the Croatian authorities to secure the return of the Muslim refugees, as stipulated by the agreement signed by Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman in November in Dayton, Ohio.

The Croatian Radio said that 20 Muslim families had returned to Jajce and that they enjoyed equal rights as the Croats.

On the other hand, Muslim Sarajevo Radio said that not a single Muslim had returned to Jajce because the local authorities were unable to guarantee their safety.

The Bosnian Croats and Muslims, aided by the regular troops of neighboring Croatia, fought each other until late 1993 over control of territories in central Bosnia. At Washington's insistence, in March 1994 they signed an agreement setting up a joint federation in Bosnia, but so far it has only remained on paper.

Serb Refugee Headquarters Issues Warning

*AU1512134995 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija
in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 14 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Republic center for the collective accommodation of refugees is facing

new problems. There is no heating in some reception centers. More and more people are getting sick and the centers cannot put them in isolation. The Headquarters for the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina issued the following warning today:

All wartime presidencies of municipalities in exile and local municipalities of the Serb Republic, offices of the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Refugees, republic, regional, and municipal Red Cross committees, and all other organizations in charge of receiving and accommodating refugees in their municipalities, are obliged to strictly follow the orders of the Serb Republic president, provisions on the accommodation of refugees, and the order issued by the headquarters on the rights of refugees in the stage of temporary accommodation. In keeping with the order issued by the headquarters of 24 September 1995, all refugees who have found accommodation for themselves in any part of the Serb Republic have a right to a temporary residence permit [privremeni boravak], humanitarian aid, welfare and medical services, the education of their children, as well as all other rights that cannot be denied by any municipal or republic institution. Regarding adherence to the plan for the distribution of refugees, it refers solely to collective accommodation and accommodation according to a decree that is implemented by municipal and state bodies, not by independent solutions to one's own accommodation. All the above-mentioned subjects are obliged, on the territory of their municipalities where refugees are granted temporary residence permits, to grant all those rights.

This warning was signed by Gojko Klickovic, president of the headquarters.

Red Cross Calls for Release of All POW's

*LD2212164995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1459 GMT 22 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 22 Dec (TANJUG) — All persons imprisoned during the conflict on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be freed without delay by 19 January 1996. This was stated to TANJUG today by Francois Bellon, head of the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the FRY.

"By signing Annex 1a, Article 9, of the Dayton and Paris Peace Agreement, accepted by both the FRY and the Republic of Croatia, the warring factions in Bosnia promised to submit lists of all those imprisoned in connection with the conflicts on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina three weeks after signing the agreement at

the latest, and to free them 30 days after the transfer of power from UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] to Ifor," Bellon explained.

The first step, Bellon said, will be for all sides (Croat, Muslim, and Serb) to submit, by 4 January, lists with the names of prisoners to the ICRC, to each other, to a joint military commission, and to Carl Bildt, high representative of the Council for the Implementation of Peace.

Once the ICRC has submitted a plan of action to the sides for the release of prisoners, its delegates will conduct talks in private with all the prisoners, at least 48 hours before they are to be freed. This will be done in order to guarantee their free choice — whether they want to be freed on the spot or transferred to the other side.

During further procedure, the ICRC will monitor the release of prisoners as a neutral mediator, but the main responsibility will lie with the sides, which should show goodwill and a readiness to fulfil what they have signed. [passage omitted]

According to Bellon, the question of missing persons is much more complicated to implement and envisages a longer time period. As soon as the prisoners are freed, the ICRC will concentrate its efforts and goodwill on achieving progress in this area. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serbs Protest Reconstruction Conference
LD2512205395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1704 GMT 25 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 25 Dec (SRNA) — Prompted by the ignorance-fraught treatment given to the Serb republic at the conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Brussels on 21 December, the Serb republic delegation sent a letter of protest to the European Commission and the special envoy for the implementation of the peace agreement, Carl Bildt, drawing their attention to the fact that such attitude toward one of the entities is contrary to the provisions of the peace agreement.

The Serb republic letter of protest, which was forwarded to SRNA today, says that Serb republic representatives had not even been invited to the conference — they took part together with a delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — that preparatory documents were worked out without the participation of the relevant institutions of the Serb republic, and that during the conference all the speakers, with exception of Mr. Bildt and representatives from Canada and Switzerland, only used the terms "Bosnians," "Bosnia-Herzegovina

Government," "the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and such like.

In this connection, the Serb republic delegation, which included Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha; Aleksa Milojevic, director of the Serb republic's Directorate for Reconstruction and Development; and Jovan Zametica, the Serb republic president's adviser, had lodged a letter of protest in Brussels on 21 December, and also forwarded it to the world media, drawing their attention to the following facts:

"1. There are three constituent and sovereign nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, i.e. Muslims. The war broke out precisely because of the attempt to disregard Serb rights.

"2. Unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina does not exist: Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to the peace agreement, consists of two entities: the Serb republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"3. There is no such a thing as the 'Bosnia-Herzegovina government.' The Dayton-Paris agreement envisages the setting up of joint institutions, among other the council of ministers. However, this will happen in six to nine months, which is also the case with regard to the central bank. The only body envisaged for the transition period is the joint interim commission; not even this commission has been set up."

The protest letter by the Serb republic delegation stresses that the approach assumed at the conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina means that either a monopoly has been granted to the Muslim side to carry out all the tasks regarding the reconstruction of both entities, or that the Serb republic has not been included in any reconstruction program.

"We are forced to inform you that this approach and method of work are unacceptable to us," the Serb republic representatives warned in Brussels on 21 December, saying that the "conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina — provided its goal is to secure adequate conditions for the strengthening of peace — has already proved to be a big failure."

The Foreign Ministry also expressed astonishment at and dissatisfaction with the silence of the world media, to which the letter of protest was forwarded in Brussels.

Serb Railroad Official on Debt Problems

AU2712145995 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija
in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 26 Dec 95

[Report by Nevena Blagojevic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the beginning of the war, the Serb Republic Railroad and Transport Company

[ZTP] has done everything to fulfill the needs of government and economic institutions. It was absolutely successful in doing so. On the other hand, the state and economic institutions did not fulfill their obligations to the ZTP. Insel [expansion unknown] owes 3 million dinars to the ZTP, the Defense Ministry owes more than 2 million, while the government made no appropriations for the costs of the railroad infrastructure. Large debts prevent the realization of the planned necessary investment.

[Dusan Spremo, head of the ZTP Department of Exploitation] We continue working regardless of the debts, and do not even dream of stopping. However, we are waiting for the right moment when the railroad will be put in the proper place.

[Blagojevic] If that does not happen?

[Spremo] If the railroad and its workers do not get or take the right role in this country, we will probably be forced to stop working soon.

[Blagojevic] Still, the ZTP workers believe that it will not come to that and propose the following:

[Spremo] Now that the war is over, the state must make up its mind and give us concrete tasks, trying, at least regarding the transport of goods, to ensure healthy competition with other forms of transportation, create market prices, and subsidize the part of the price that would jeopardize certain activities and thus make up for the cost of the ZTP. [sentence as heard]

[Blagojevic] In the world, trains run at 140 km per hour. Our trains run at 60 km per hour, and railroad workers say that they will go faster given timely investment. Other countries allocate 40 percent of the budget for railroad transport, because the development of the railroad also mirrors the prosperity of a country.

Tudjman Upbeat About Current Trends

*LD2712185095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman hosted a Christmas and New Year reception in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb today for representatives of the Croatian Assembly, government, judiciary, prefects, and businessmen. Mira Baric has a detailed report:

[Baric] Croatian Assembly Speaker Vlatko Pavletic addressed the Croatian president on behalf of the assembly deputies. [passage omitted] Thanking the representatives of the legislative, executive and, judicial authorities and Croatian businessmen for their contribution to building our country, President Tudjman said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] This year, 1995, in which we celebrated the fifth anniversary of establishing the independent, democratic, and sovereign Croatian state will be remembered, as the assembly speaker has said, by its exceptional historical results for the Croatian nation and the Croatian state.

I would like to thank and praise all of you for everything that you have done personally and within the framework of your respective institutions, enabling the Croatian Army not only to liberate the occupied areas of Croatia, but also through its victories in Croatia and Bosnia to change the strategic balance in former Yugoslavia and in this part of Europe.

Without the participation of all of you, everyone in his respective field, this would not have been possible to achieve; the efforts made by the entire Croatian people striving toward achieving these holy goals of liberating every inch of the Croatian land would not have been achieved. All your efforts, from the assembly to the government, judiciary, and businessmen, all efforts made by the Croatian people were directed toward ending the war, liberating our country to enable us to devote ourselves to the overall reconstruction of Croatia in economic, cultural, and scientific areas. I hope that we completed that period in 1995.

What remains to be done will be done in a peaceful way with help from the international community and, I can say, our friends, partners, allies. If it had not been for the firm promises made by the most important international players, we would have embarked on the liberation of the Croatian Podunavlje this year but, as you know, in order not to suffer further casualties, in order not to expose our towns to destruction, and in order to coordinate the realization of our national and state goals with the important players in the international arena, we gave up that option and accepted a peaceful solution.

We have the guarantees from the most responsible international players that we will integrate those areas of the Croatian Podunavlje in the constitutional and legal system of Croatia in a peaceful way. I am convinced such an agreement will be implemented in the next year.

This means that we have left the war behind and now all our efforts, the efforts of those present here from the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities and businessmen, have to be directed toward the development of Croatia in peaceful conditions.

In addition to this, ladies and gentlemen, we should take advantage of the external circumstances surrounding Croatia today, the circumstances which it gained owing to the policy of resolute defense and protection of national interests, but also the policy of coordinating its national and state interests with the fundamental elements of world politics. We should have the courage, common sense, and initiative to make use of these favorable circumstances.

At the same time, we must not for a moment forget that all our achievements were due to the stability of democratic order and the strength and common sense of the state policy.

In all its future moves aimed at resolving any individual or strategic issues of the Croatian nation and state, we must not forget that even today, when the world and the important elements of world politics not only need but also respect Croatia as a regional power, so that together with Croatia they could in their own way resolve their own problems relating to mutual international influence in the Balkans, in the neighboring Balkans, and in southeast Europe [sentence as heard].

Consequently, if even for a moment we were to lose our bearings and allow hesitation to enter our internal affairs, you can be sure—and I am addressing you as the most responsible people for the creation of the independent and sovereign Croatia—that we would find ourselves in the position of having certain solutions imposed on us, solutions which we found hard to get rid of and which we would not like to see again.

We have advocated our freedom, democracy, and sovereignty, and also our readiness to normalize relations and cooperate with all neighboring states on the basis of mutual recognition, but we must on no account and in no form allow the return to the framework which [words indistinct].

Apart from general tasks concerning the economic, cultural, and scientific development of Croatia, I take this opportunity to point out to you the task of developing cooperation with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. These are not just our national, state, and strategic

interests, but also those of Europe and western civilization.

It is not the right time for me to tell you about how we got to this, how we reached the agreements which will secure the Croatian state and its strategic interests for centuries to come, but it is the right time for all of us, for our public, to realize how important comprehensive cooperation with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is, which will not be an easy job or an easy task at all, but our long-term strategic interests require that we resolve this issue successfully.

I have no doubts, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends and assistants, that we will successfully complete this task, since we were capable of resolving all the issues we encountered on the road to our free, democratic, and sovereign Croatian state. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Government To Propose Amendments to Property Law

*LD2712171095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the following announcement from the press office of the Croatian government:

Taking into consideration the requests of exiled Croatian citizens of Serb nationality to be allowed to return and reclaim their property in the Republic of Croatia, the government of the Republic of Croatia will propose to the assembly at its session beginning on 15 January 1996 amendments to the law on the temporary seizure and administration of certain types of property under summary procedures. The changes will include the deletion of clauses on deadlines for returning to the Republic of Croatia and reclaiming property for owner occupancy. Remaining questions relating to the abandoned property of the exiled Croatian citizens will be resolved under a separate agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the framework of normalization of overall Croatian-Serb relations or by special law.

Conditions Posed for Accepting Disarmament Process

*AU2712215295 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 95 p 2*

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic: "The Right Move by Granic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The preliminary disarmament conference on the former Yugoslavia, which ended on 18 December in Petersberg near Bonn, was already

successful for the host after it was agreed that it should be continued in Vienna next month (probably on 4 January). To Germany, which very much insisted on including the provisions on disarmament in the Dayton agreement, it is particularly important to prevent any possible race in armament, which might occur when (in June of next year) the embargo on the import of weapons into the states created after the fall of former Yugoslavia is definitely lifted.

Bonn is particularly afraid of a possible continuation of the war, which in that case would be much more intense, which means that there would come another wave of refugees, which would once more burden Germany first of all—the country in which momentarily there are 400,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia and which, according to official data, has up to now spent as much as 14 billion German marks on them.

That is why Klaus Kinkel did not hesitate to let the warring parties know that if they oppose the negotiations or if they behave in an unproductive way, they will end up in international isolation and be excluded from financial help for reconstruction.

On the other hand, the conference in Petersberg showed that it was illusory to expect the disarmament and establishment of confidence-building measures (the latter refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the last deadline being 26 January!) as long as the key problems were not solved. The method of punishment and award is of no help there simply because it concerns the vital interests of particular states.

The head of the Croatian delegation, Foreign Minister Mate Granic, warned of that circumstance in a "dramatic way," as one German paper formulated it. He clearly said that Croatia could not enter the disarmament process and accept its possible results if Belgrade did not recognize Zagreb in the meantime and if the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region [eastern Slavonia] did not start, meaning if the paramilitary Serb formations there were not disarmed very soon. Moreover, he threatened that Zagreb would withdraw from those negotiations altogether if those problems were not solved fast.

Granic knows what he is talking about very well. The international community is primarily concentrated on Bosnia, and it could easily happen that it neglects the crucial Croatian problem, which is the implementation of the Erdut-Zagreb agreement. Serbia uses that and poses unacceptable territorial claims (Prevlaka) as a condition for recognition, to which Zagreb cannot and will not agree. However, for Croatia it is important that Belgrade recognizes it diplomatically because that would be a key signal that the Erdut-Zagreb agreement

is taken seriously. On the other hand, it is also a basis for any normalization for Serbo-Croatian relations altogether, without which there can be no stable peace in this region, which also means—no disarmament.

Butrus Butrus-Ghali's escapade of over 9,000 soldiers for eastern Slavonia is one of those negative signals to which Ganic reacted in Petersberg. Another negative signal is the delay in the passage of the relevant resolution of the Security Council. There are some signs that the French, the British, and Russians are trying to facilitate the position of Belgrade to the disadvantage of Zagreb. Two events of Petersberg, both of which happened on Monday, speak about that.

The French delegation supported Belgrade's minister Milutinovic when he asked for the admittance of "Yugoslavia" in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], from which it was excluded in 1992. He posed that as a sort of condition for their further participation in negotiations, which are to be continued under the aegis of that all-European organization.

Of course, nothing will come out of that because for something like that there has to be a consensus of all members [of OSCE], which also means the acceptance of Croatia. But the formal understanding for that issue that was given to Belgrade, which still holds Croatian Danube region under occupation, which is not ready to solve the succession question, which has still not recognized Macedonia, and so on, speaks about political interests and about an atmosphere in which, if Zagreb is not active, it might happen that the Croatian Danube regions simply gets "forgotten."

When Ganic decisively expressed the attitude of Croatia, the head of the British delegation, Minister of Foreign Affairs Rifkind, got particularly excited, practically asking what it was that the Croats wanted at all. According to his interpretation, Belgrade will recognize Zagreb anyway, and eastern Slavonia has already been solved as a problem! Therefore Rifkind added that, after all, Croatia had signed the Dayton agreement and that now it was obliged to act accordingly, which means to continue the talks without any additional conditions.

At that, the Brit, of course, forgot the key circumstance. Namely, that Belgrade has also initialed the agreement on the normalization of Serbo-Croat relationships and on the mutual recognition, and yet in Paris they did not want to sign it. Despite that, it can be said that minister Ganic, with his clear warning, addressed, among others, to Washington as well, has still managed to move things from the still stand. The reaction of the head of Bonn diplomacy Kinkel also speaks about that. At the final press conference he clearly said that for the time being the most important thing was for the inter-

national community to get engaged in inducing Belgrade to diplomatically recognize Zagreb (and Macedonia). Moreover, Kinkel added that at the same time recognition of Croatia by Serbia was a condition for normalization of Serbo-German relationships. The efforts for an expedited passing of the relevant Security Council resolution were also in that line, and the contents of that resolution would fulfill the justified Croatian demands and interests.

All that says that Ganic made the right move in Petersberg. All the more since political pressures are a legitimate means of politics, particularly if some of its actors are prone to amnesia.

Dispute With Serbia Over Prevlaka Viewed

AU2812113095 Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian
22 Dec 95 p 9

[Commentary by Ilija Zirdum: "Prevlaka Has Belonged to Croatia From Time Immemorial"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week at the peace conference in Paris there was no expected recognition between Croatia and Serbia, although it had been announced in a serious manner. Why? As Dr. Tudjman, president of the Republic, and Minister Ganic said, recognition failed to take place because of Serbian demands for Prevlaka. Slobodan Milosevic avoided answering that question by leaving it to the "other eye in the head," President Momir Bulatovic of Montenegro, to comment. Bulatovic claims that Croatia is not ready to negotiate the exchange of territories.

The possibility of an exchange in the far south has caused commotion and agitated spirits, and there was a lot of talk about it in the parliament. It seems there are no reasons for concern, because the Croatian Constitution is clear: if the Croatian internationally recognized borders are in question, any kind of change is subject to the will of the Croatian Parliament and the Croatian people, that is, to referendum. Commotion and concern are caused by those rabble-rousers who stick to the motto "The worse, the better!"

True, recently we could have heard or read two utterly opposite assertions regarding the value of Prevlaka. One group claims that Prevlaka has no particular strategic value, while one Croatian general says that the same Prevlaka is very important strategically and that Croatia, if it decides to do so, could get a far, far bigger territory in exchange for it.

The contrast in the assertions on the strategic value of Prevlaka, abused by some people, has been harmonized by the same Croatian general who explained that it was very important for Croatia who could move into

Prevlaka and cast anchor in Boka Kotorska Bay. It is not all the same, particularly not for the Republic of Croatia, whether the secret Russian wishes will come true—that the Russian Navy sails for the first time in history close to our coast by using Boka Kotorska as their base, or the same Boka Kotorska Bay will be used by the Americans, as Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic recently offered. In the first case, Prevlaka is strategically very important for the Republic of Croatia, and in the second case it is a bit less important.

Blackmailing Belongs to the Past

Even before, on many occasions we could have been convinced that in the West there is great ignorance regarding the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Naturally, we are sensitive when, for instance, a wrong map appears in the Pentagon, on which Prevlaka is presented as part of Montenegro and the occupied part of Croatia as a part of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unbelievable, but we are not surprised at discovering that the UN financial department still thinks that the Croatian currency is the dinar, although the Croatian kuna has been circulating for more than a year and a half. That does not mean that Croatia should pass silently over all this. No! It should and it must react, which Croatian diplomacy has been doing regularly.

The gentlemen in the West and in the East should be informed that the Croatian border as early as the 15th century involved Prevlaka, too, and that the time like 1941 is gone, when the Croatian leadership had to give up parts of Croatian territory to strangers. Today's Croatia cannot be blackmailed by either Venice, or Vienna, or Budapest, and not least by a dictate from Belgrade. Nor can the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov change anything about it, either.

It is true that recently the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov entered the southern Adriatic through the Strait of Otranto. The explanation of a Russian admiral was that the aircraft carrier supports the mission of the Russian soldiers who will be members of IFOR [Implementation Force] in Tuzla. The U.S. aircraft carrier America is in the same role and in any case close to Kuzetsov.

Admiral Milan Zec, commander of the Serbian fleet, has expressed premature joy that the Russians sailed into the Adriatic to put pressure on Croatia and assist the Serbs to get Prevlaka, and even to give a part of the coast for Karadzic's Serb Republic to get an access to the sea. It is a false encouragement of Serbian hopes and unrealistic wishes that the Russian carrier has come to support Serbian demands and force Croatia to change its mind about the unchangeability of its borders.

Vain Hopes in Russia

The reality, for which the Serbs have no taste, is completely different. The Russians will not clash with the Americans because of Serbian wishes. Yugoslav General Veljko Kadijevic, a Serb from Imotski, experienced that personally, when in the critical years for Croatia (1991, 1992) he called three times upon his Russian brothers to help him, but Gorbachev and Grachev three times refused to help him.

Traditional Serbian friends, the Russians and the French, have perfectly sobered up from the Serbian friendship. Dozens of French soldiers have returned home in coffins, murdered by a Serbian "friendly" bullet; dozens of them were tied to posts as hostages in Pale; two pilots have spent 100 days in a Serbian "vacation center." All this sufficed to make the French realize that a historical tradition is one thing, and the reality today something completely different, particularly in politics and relations with the Serbs.

Imperial Russia, as well as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, belong to the ancient times. The Serbs have been using the Russian-Serbian friendship as ordered by the daily Serbian politics, and it is far from being realistic. The Russians will not antagonize the whole world for the sake of the Serbs, and one could hear that from the highest position in Russia. Even the militarily powerful Russia has realized that without the West a cataclysm would follow.

Besides, one can mention that the Russian aircraft carrier is almost the only thing worth anything in the Russian fleet. It is known that the condition of the Russian Navy is disastrous, that the majority of ships have become corroded by rust in their docks because of the lack of spare parts. However, in order to show that they are still an "equal" rival on the seas, too, they have sent the "Kuzetsov."

There are claims that Croatia is thin (narrow) in the south. However, Croatia is today strong enough and capable of defending all its borders, those in the south as well. And possible future attacks would mean pushing the enemy to such a distance from which the he would be incapable of attacking the Dubrovnik coast. Therefore Croatia does not worry too much about it and will certainly not exchange its territory because of it.

First Recognition, Then Trade

Serbia wants to gamble to the end, trying to profit by getting Prevlaka. But it is a well-known fact that all gamblers in the end lose even their underpants. This last maneuver of theirs was a failure, and if we would get involved in forecasts, one could say that it would not

take long until the mutual recognition. It will take place even without Prevlaka because Serbia needs Croatia more than Croatia needs Serbia.

In the last couple of days we have witnessed that Serbian businessmen have rushed to Zagreb to sign trade contracts, particularly for the distribution of oil from INA [Croatian oil company] and opening the Adriatic oil pipeline toward Pancevo. Serbia has also been bothered by the railroad, road, and telecommunications blockade. As much as they claim that they can reach Europe through Hungary, everybody knows that the way to Austria, Italy, France, and so on, goes through Croatia.

As Dr. Mate Granic, Croatian minister of foreign affairs, said, the contracts, traffic, and telecommunications would wait for the recognition. Regardless of the lifting of the sanctions, Croatia will open its roads, oil pipeline, and postal communications only after the recognition.

Dr. Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador to the UN in Geneva, has very humorously and wittily answered to the Serbian demands which perfectly fit into the Serbian unsurpassed fantasy, by having said: "Yes, we can make an exchange—we will give them Prevlaka if they give us Boka Kotorska!"

And both the Serbs and the Montenegrins know very well that the Republic of Croatia is no longer thin in any of its parts.

New Minister of Economy Interviewed

96BA0033B Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR
in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Davor Stern, new Croatian minister of the economy, by Ratko Peter; place and date not given: "Everything for Fresh Capital"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Davor Stern is the new minister of the economy in the Matesa government. Although he was also a member of Prime Minister Valentic's government (only a few months, of course, as minister without portfolio), it is a fact that this minister is a bit "anonymous," a person who is somehow in the shadow of the media. By profession, he is a petroleum mining engineer, but his professional and personal career has been as a microeconomist with a great deal of work experience. He worked at one time in the Import Department of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline, then in INA-Commerce [expansion unknown], and then in the same firm as the head of the representative office in Moscow; after that, he was once again in Moscow, but in the American firm Salomon Brothers, then in Switzerland, and he also worked for a time in Italy. Once Croatian independence was established, he became assistant minister in the Foreign*

Ministry responsible for Croatia's relations with foreign countries; afterward he became the first minister without portfolio in Prime Minister Valentic's government, and now he has become minister of the economy in the most recent government.

[Peter] Mr. Stern, you are the new minister of the economy. Many people say that "your" ministry somehow has not been clearly defined. There have been quite a few changes in ministers, many powers have not been clear, or they simply have overlapped with those of other ministries. What is your view of all this, and will there be any changes in that regard?

[Stern] I was minister without portfolio in Prime Minister Valentic's government, but in the field of foreign economic relations. We even toyed with the idea of establishing a separate ministry for that area. At the same time, I was given the task of looking into shipbuilding, concessions, and free trade zones. As for the Ministry of the Economy itself, it is difficult for me to comment on the structure of the part of the government I personally head, but also to some extent I am not as yet fully informed because I have been minister for only a few days. It is a fact that every country must have a ministry of the economy. The worst thing that can happen here would be an overlapping of certain powers. There has been some of that, and there will be in the future. Elimination of those overlapping powers will, in fact, be one of the biggest tasks of Prime Minister Matesa and the new government, and it is certain that the Ministry of the Economy will experience certain changes. There have been quite a few changes in the past, beginning with the top people, Miksa, Cermak, Vidosevic, and for a short time there was too much "wandering" for a ministry of that importance. At the same time, there has been a metamorphosis in the structure itself. "Room has been found" in this ministry for the tourist industry, the economy, the industrial sector, and fuel and power. At the moment, both trade and the fuel and power industry are in the Ministry of the Economy, although in a normal market economy the ministry of the economy would not extend over industry, and that would apply to the fuel and power industry, especially if enterprises have been privatized. [Text illegible] places for trade, both domestic and foreign.

[Peter] Because you have been in the past government as well as this one, can you define in some way what essential changes there will be from the Valentic government?

[Stern] I have already mentioned that we must try to minimize the overlapping of powers between ministries. I would not speak about other ministries, but in the ministry which I now head there have been cases when

certain things were identical with the Finance Ministry, certain things with affairs of foreign economic relations, etc. As for the new government, I would immediately say that I am not a macroeconomic expert, nor am I an economist, but my vocation has been microeconomic. I am a man who deals in specifics. The problems are overwhelming, and relative to the previous government this one will quite certainly be a continuity government, because a general policy will be continued, but by contrast with the last government, which simply was unable to concern itself with many specific problems, and we know why, really difficult days may lie ahead for this government. The last government laid the macroeconomic foundations, the system, the currency, certain general indicators, etc. Now we have to turn to specific matters, and that means specific solutions. In some places, this will mean painful cuts.

[Peter] You spoke of specific solutions. Exactly what are you referring to? Many people are already speculating on the national currency; even many economists say that the exchange rate is overvalued and that we can expect devaluation and indeed inflation.

[Stern] I support the theory that our currency is not overvalued. I am convinced that we have both the strength and the opportunity to increase the value of the kuna 30 to 40 percent by making a greater commitment ourselves. I will give you a personal example. While I was working in a foreign representative office of INA, I finished work at 1600 hours and went home. When I was working for an American firm, there were times when I would stay late into the night, and because of the time difference they "got me up" even at 0300 hours. This does not mean that the worker in the factory should work 12 hours, but the entire superstructure, sales, exports, will have to work much more. As far as specific matters go, they are the transformation and privatization. We either have to get a handle on misappropriation or stop talking about it because this is creating a very adverse climate outside the country's borders. All of this is bruited about abroad and before any foreigner comes to Croatia he does a good job of checking out everything. Many pieces of legislation have not been fully defined. These are all reasons why we still have a very low percentage of investment. This also applies to our people in the emigre community. This is a big problem. Another is the immense domestic debt, and here a big cut will have to be made. Either we will have to activate the courts much more rapidly and undertake direct collection, or we will be marking time. A system cannot exist in which people take things but do not pay for them. This is called theft everywhere. And then there is the question of the banks and interest rates. The market rate cannot be 25 percent in a country where

inflation is 2 percent per year. There are cases when foreign banks are offering us loans at an interest rate of between 8 and 9 percent through our banking system. However, when that loan reaches the ultimate user, the rate of interest rises to even 25 percent. There is no branch of the economy that can support that.

[Peter] Now that we are talking about the banks, the former prime minister announced their financial rescue. This probably will be one of the greatest challenges of the new government.

[Stern] The banks have been put into that situation for objective as well as subjective reasons. People outside know all about it. When a bank fails, it is bankrupt, it is shut down, its property is sold, divided up, and so on. Our banks probably got into this situation because at a certain point they helped to avoid something which could have had bad consequences in the framework of overall economic policy. They are also in this position in part because of political involvement. There have been reasons, there has been the war, everything that we have gone through in these four years is an exploit in itself. It is clear that some firms, certain specific structures, have suffered in all this. No one ever posed the question of the price of "Operation Flash" or "Operation Storm." The amounts of money are immense, but the result was achieved. We will have to take a serious approach to the problem of the banks, but my position is that some things cannot be separated. For example, the financial rescue of shipbuilding largely signifies financial rescue of the banks as well. We could arrive at a solution to the problem through good coordination of government institutions.

[Peter] You have spent many years abroad, relations with foreign economic partners was your field in the last government. Concessions are of particular interest in this area. It seems that we still have an adverse climate which treats the concessions as a possible danger to the country.

[Stern] Concessions are not foreign at all to the market system, they are not something from which one needs to flee. It is clear that in granting concessions we must be careful not to encroach upon certain strategic and security considerations. But it is not a question of that; every concession is welcome. Although this is not my area as a minister, although in a way it is as a member of the government, I will take the liberty of saying that we need concessions. The infrastructure cannot be financed from the budget. We talk about improving tourist services. That is simply impossible with roads like these, and the quality tourists will continue to detour around us. The concession issue is only hesitation about ceding to someone a part of our territory to carry out

certain operations. That is certainly better than selling it. In our country, any foreign firm can buy a house, thereby becoming owner of that house forever. No mystery should be made about opening a highway or some corridor for 30 years. The one who invests his money must get it back, but must also earn it. Afterward, what has been built remains behind us. It does not bother the Americans at all that most of New York is in the hands of foreigners. For all practical purposes, New York is not American property, but this does not bother anyone, because those people are working there, paying taxes, and everyone benefits.

[Peter] What people seem to be interested in most is the announced annual growth rate of 10 percent. Given all the circumstances in which Croatia finds itself, how realistic are such estimates?

[Stern] That growth is not unfeasible, but it will be very difficult under present conditions. We will have to solve many of these problems, while emphasizing the social factor. We have 230,000 unemployed, 70 or even 80 percent of whom, I am convinced, are working somewhere in one way or another. The system for monitoring unemployment should be brought under control, and we will have to conduct a major audit. Some of the money which will come from sales and privatization will go to balancing social welfare, but, even so, the government will undertake all the changes that are necessary rigorously and without beating about the bush. I repeat, we will be concerned about social peace, but also about socialization of all possible asocial phenomena. I am referring here to big firms, shipyards, the steel mill, and even INA. All of our large firms are oversized relative to the real needs, and also relative to what they offer, and we will not be able to offer for sale any of those firms as they now stand. But our interest is to obtain fresh capital.

Bombing by Islamic Fundamentalists Detailed
96BA0042A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian
3 Oct 95 pp 2-4

[Article by Igor Alborghetti: "The Time Bomb in Rijeka Was Set by the Terrorist Organization Al-Gamma'a-Al Islamia Because the Croatian Government Delivered Its Leader Through France to Egypt, Where He Has Been Condemned to Death by Hanging!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Abu Talat, one of the leaders of the terrorist organization Islamic Group, who traveled to Croatia under the name Jakob Izet on 12 September 1995, has been turned over to Egyptian authorities. On 18 September, four days after his arrest, Abu Talat was taken by special plane from Zagreb to France, where the Egyptian security service took him into custody

and transported him to Cairo. In Egypt, Talat was condemned to death by hanging in 1992.

"Croatia is certainly not holding Abu Talat, nor have we managed to register his stay on our soil," Smiljan Reljic, assistant minister of internal affairs, said in a press conference held on Tuesday, 23 October. According to him, a person answering to Talat's description was seen at one of the border checkpoints with Bosnia-Herzegovina, although there is no solid evidence of this. What is more, Smiljan Reljic also says that Interpol is also looking for Talat, which is not very likely, because that organization never issues arrest warrants for political, religious, or war crimes. Interpol concerns itself only with criminals, which Talat certainly is not.

Reljic, who heads the Department for Protection of the Constitutional Order, is the first government official to say anything official about the case of Sheikh Abu Talat, that is, Ibrahim Jakob Izet, which began with his unusual arrest and alleged deportation, but culminated on 20 October with the explosion of the bomb in Rijeka.

"Croats, release Abu Talat before it is too late! The reason for this heroic act is to show Croats that the case of Sojh Talat Fuad Kasim will involve rivers of bloodshed, which is detrimental to your issues in Croatia and outside it," says the message which the Islamists sent to the editors of AL HAYAT, a Lebanese daily which is published in Arabic, the day after the Rijeka explosion. The message ends with the words: "...close the door to hell which is open before you, and prevent things from going any further."

The First Threats to Croatia

The first threats to Croatia were expressed slightly more than a month ago, about 20 September, when an unidentified male voice telephoned Mohamed Salah, an AL HAYAT journalist, and told him that the Islamic Group would punish the Republic of Croatia for arresting one of its leaders, Sheikh Abu Talat. Unofficial reports indicate that certain Croatian diplomatic missions abroad have also received threatening letters with the same or similar content recently.

There is hardly any doubt that it was the followers of Sheikh Talat who placed the bomb in the courtyard at the Primorje-Goranye Police Department. The explosive device was activated by "another" person—a person so far unidentified, who at the moment of the explosion was at a safe distance from the site of the event. The Croatian police and security service are conducting an intensive search for that person.

Checks have been set up at border crossings, and driver identity and vehicles are being checked more frequently

on the highways. In Zagreb, it is no longer permitted to park automobiles in front of police stations. It is obvious that the police know quite well what the fugitive looks like, because they are not checking documents, but only the physical appearance of travelers. Immediately after the explosion, the police arrested a certain number of persons who happened to be in the vicinity, or who on the basis of certain other indicators might have been involved in the crime. No public statement has yet been made as to whether any of them is actually suspected of taking part in the attack.

The bomb, which was delivered by a Fiat Regatta automobile with Italian license plates, was not activated randomly, as the police have said up to now, but with the intention of killing the driver, who was hindered in his original attempt to carry the bomb into the building. The new and completely different version of the event in the parking lot of the Rijeka Police Department, and this is confirmed by sources close to investigating authorities, indicates that the original plan of the terrorists called for a much bloodier ending.

According to well-informed sources, two persons took part in the bombing: the direct participant, now dead, and the "other" person already mentioned, who witnesses say is of Arab origin, and who left the site in a great hurry as soon as the sound of the explosion was heard.

According to the original conception of the terrorists, the bomb was supposed to be placed in the building, more precisely, in the room where personal documents of individuals are issued. Had that happened, there would have been more than a few dozen dead and injured.

The Islamic Group

The car's entry into the police department's parking lot was the biggest mistake in the plan because, according to GLOBUS's well-informed source, in this way the terrorists called attention to themselves at the beginning of the action. The policeman on duty, not suspecting what was involved, told the driver to leave the parking lot, which is intended only for official vehicles.

At that point, the GLOBUS source says, the driver, a person of Arab origin, backed up in the direction of the service entrance to the police building. A few seconds later, there was the sound of a powerful explosion. The car was blown to pieces, and the driver was thrown a distance of several meters. He died immediately.

The name of the person killed was established after an autopsy and identification that very evening, says the GLOBUS informant: It was John Fawzan, born in Kuwait 35 years ago, but there is warranted suspicion that he had false documents. The upper part of the

driver's body was blown to bits, but pathologists in the Susak hospital literally pieced it together with parts gathered in the vicinity.

The assassins entered Croatia from Italy in two cars, a few days before the bombing. According to certain indications, they were recruited in the United States or Canada. The pattern of activity corresponds in all respects to the "work" of Arab terrorists. The Islamic Group, established back in 1975, is openly at war with Egyptian authorities and is increasingly popular among the poor, university students, and the unemployed. It is fighting for establishment of an Islamic state, the overthrow of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, and the introduction of shariah law.

Western countries, especially the United States, consider it a mortal enemy of the Islamic world. Members of the Islamic Group, headed by the blind Sheikh Abdul Rahman, were recently found guilty by a New York court of the attack on the World Trade Center and other bombing plots.

Talat himself was sentenced to death by hanging by a military court in Alexandria in 1992 for a plot against the state. Following the spectacular assassination of President El Sadat, he spent seven years in Egyptian prisons. Experts on world terrorism describe him as an intellectual and spiritual leader. This is the status he had among members of the Islamic Group in Denmark. It is said, he was known as the organization's spokesman and the man who obtained the money necessary for the group to operate. During his stay in Pakistan, he also engaged in journalism.

Plastic Explosives

There are many hypotheses about the quantity, type, and origin of the explosives used in the attack. GLOBUS journalists visited the site of the attack with explosives experts. This much was obvious: The explosive was placed in the front on the passenger's side, and the total amount of explosive was relatively small. All the windows in the low building of the police station closest to the site of the explosion were broken, and the double door was knocked off. There was no visible damage to the brick building. By world standards, it is assumed that the pressure of the shock wave was between 0.126 and 0.230 bar. In a shock wave of that strength, a person receives injuries from flying glass or stone.

Windows on the ground floor and a few on the second floor were broken in the building of the police department on the main street. The shock wave on that structure was not quite so strong, 0.094 bar, and the damage was less. On a third structure in the immediate vicinity, the building of the Bank of Zagreb, there was

no major damage. The crater in the asphalt at the site of the explosion indicates two facts: The explosive device was on the floor of the car or was dropped onto the parking lot.

It was established from the damage to the building that a kilogram of plastic explosive was used without a metal cover. In the former Yugoslavia, this explosive was produced in half-kilogram packages wrapped in plastic, and in the West in cardboard cartons weighing 0.46 kg.

This kind of explosive is very safe to handle. If it is burning, it cannot explode. Nor can it be activated with blows of a hammer. It is difficult, then, to accept the official version of the event that the explosive was activated when the car hit the safety island or when the device was thrown on the pavement.

The explosive is detonated, a GLOBUS expert resolutely asserts, only with a DK-8 detonator by a firing pin, fuse, or electric detonator.

It is not difficult to obtain this kind of explosive, even in Croatia. On the Zagreb black market, PEP, the popular name for plastic explosives made in Yugoslavia, costs about 30 German marks per kilogram, but the price has dropped to half since "Operation Storm."

The bombing attack, never before recorded in the annals of the Croatian Police, is only the unhappy consequence of an event which has not been officially explained even after a month. As GLOBUS has already written, Egyptian Sheikh Abu Talat, otherwise known as Ibrahim Jakob Izet, was arrested on 13 September at 0030 hours at an unknown address in Zagreb, with two other people. That same day, Judge Mario Mestrovic at No. 4 Djordjevica Street fined him 147 kunas and 87 lipas for a violation of the Law on Movement and Sojourn of Foreigners, and he ordered him to leave the Republic of Croatia. Since then, there has been no trace of Talat, that is, Ibrahim Jakob Izet.

The Danish Government requested by verbal note an explanation from the Croatian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] concerning his status, the response to which was that Ibrahim J. Izet is no longer on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, because he was apprehended in the street without valid documents. A few days later, Carl Bergsoe, Ibrahim J. Izet's Danish lawyer, sent to a Zagreb associate power of attorney from Izet's wife, so that he could establish his whereabouts through legal channels.

"No one is able to say officially where Ibrahim Jakob Izet is," says Zagreb lawyer Niko Djuric. "I have gone to the judge and asked him to grant me the legal right to examine the case file, but I was not allowed to do that, and Judge Mestrovic read me the content of the

document," the lawyer continued. He said that the file does not include a copy of the decision on the violation. The lawyer's assertions could not be checked with Judge Mestrovic because, according to his secretary, he is attending meetings, and so will not be in the office all day.

"Because of this situation I sent a letter on 23 October to Nikica Valentic, prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, in the expectation that he would help me to obtain information about the fate of Ibrahim Jakob Izet," said the lawyer Niko Djuric. A letter saying the same thing was also sent to Miroslav Separovic, minister of justice, back on 2 October, but there was no answer.

"When we talk about a law-governed state, then it is unthinkable that anything like this should be possible. If the arrest of Ibrahim Jakob Izet is a matter of national security or a state secret, then it should be stated as such, and much of this would be clearer," Niko Djuric said. When sentence was pronounced, his lawyer says, Talat was quite calm.

Claus Bergsoe, a lawyer from Copenhagen, knows no more than his Croatian colleague. The news from Croatia caught him by surprise. "I heard about the bombing in Rijeka only yesterday along with assertions that the Islamic Group is behind this," he said. Attorney Bergsoe has been representing Abu Talat and his wife Amani Mahran since 1992, when Talat arrived in Denmark from Pakistan seeking political asylum. "If it is true that Talat is now in Egypt," the Danish attorney continued, "there is no doubt that he will be executed because the sentence of the military court is final."

Background of Talat's Arrest

Dr. Ahmed Moussa Ahmer Mahmoud, who also introduces himself as Dr. Ahmed Al Abed, Talat's interpreter and a witness of the arrest, sent word to Talat's friends in Denmark that Talat had been detained by the Croatian authorities longer than was stated in the note sent to the Danish consulate, and that it is not true, as alleged, that he was arrested in the street. He was arrested in a residence. He says that Talat could not have violated the Law on the Movement and Sojourn of Foreigners, which prescribes a period of 24 hours to report sojourn, because the arrest was made less than 12 hours after he entered Croatia.

It is evident from a copy of the air reservation from the Dutch travel agency Top Travel, where Talat bought the tickets, that he arrived in Croatia on Flight 451 of Croatia Airlines from Amsterdam, on 12 September at 1415 hours. He was arrested at 0030 hours on 13 September. Ahmed Al Abed, or Ahmed Moussa Ahmer Mahmoud, said that a great number of police

entered the dwelling, demanding that they tell them where the bearded man was. After that, they searched a neighboring apartment and arrested him, the owner of the neighboring apartment, and Talat.

Abed was released two days later, on 15 September, and he was told at that time that Talat had already left Croatia. It is important to mention that Abu Talat also had a return ticket to Amsterdam on 28 September that had been paid for but not used.

Sheikh Abu Talat's arrest and extradition to Egypt are a serious blow to the Islamic Group, perhaps the

most serious since it was founded. A year ago, Abdel Gali Islamias, first among the five equal leaders of the Islamic Group, was killed in a gunfight by Egyptian security forces. Mohamed Islambuli was kidnapped in Pakistan, and is now in an American prison. Mustafa Hamza is in hiding in Sudan, and was involved in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak last summer. Ayman Al Zavahari, according to recent information, is living in Switzerland or Norway.

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Gligorov Meets Albanian PDP Delegation

AU2712183195 Skopje MIC in English 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Kiro Gligorov held a meeting yesterday with a delegation of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP], led by the president of the Party Abdurahman Aliti.

President Kiro Gligorov briefed the delegation on the political activities that are to follow when he returns to his duties shortly. He emphasized the need to have a high level of understanding between the political parties and readiness to make personal efforts and commitments in overcoming the problems, especially those that apply to high education.

Further on PDP Meeting

LD2712162295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1415 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 27 Dec (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], had a meeting yesterday [26 December] with a delegation of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] led by Abdurahman Aliti, Skopje papers say today.

The chairman of this leading Albanian party, which holds four ministerial posts in Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski's coalition government, briefed the state president about party and national views on the political situation in the republic.

According to a statement issued by the PDP today, the Gligorov-Aliti talks highlighted the problem of the functioning of the government and the problem of university education in the Albanian language.

President Gligorov informed the PDP representatives about political activities since he resumed presidential duty. He spoke of "the need for a high degree of understanding among political parties and his readiness for personal involvement in overcoming problems."

Leaders of Albanian parties in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia recently warned the Skopje administration that their deputies to the parliament and in executive bodies would leave their posts unless their demand for legalization of the ethnic university in Tetovo, whose existence is contrary to the constitution of the republic, is accepted.

Official, Diplomatic Visas for Albania Abolished

AU2712183295 Skopje MIC in English 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yesterday, the Albanian Government adopted the agreement with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] on the abolition of the official and diplomatic visas between the two countries.

MAKFAKS reports that the Government in Tirana also adopted the agreements on the assessment and settlement of border incidents, as well as some technical issues related to the border zone between Albania and Macedonia.

Radio Tirana, in reporting the government's announcement, assessed that the documents that were adopted that day will serve to improve the relations between the two countries.

VMRO-DP Leader Supports Gligorov's Policy

AU2712163495 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 27 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Vladimir Golubovski, president of the VMRO-DP, by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "Strategic Mistakes of Opposition Oligarchies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party] believes that the Dayton agreement reaffirms the U.S. role and its ability to sustain its interest in global peace in the world, which has a positive effect for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] because of its association with the United States.

[Golubovski] This means that the integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia is not at stake. I believe that all discussion about secret plans in Dayton and Paris related to our country is speculation and that Macedonia is not a subject of secret bargaining aimed at achieving an overall solution in the region.

Firm Position on Name

[Geroski] Are you not concerned with the postponed mutual recognition between Macedonia and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]?

[Golubovski] I am slightly disappointed, but I believe that it is a question of bilateral relations between two states resulting from the incomplete peace arrangement. The Serbian side is as much burdened by this question as the Macedonian because of the possible implications and misunderstandings.

[Geroski] The FRY wants us to compromise, that is, it asks us to recognize it as successor to the former Yugoslav federation.

[Golubovski] That is how the problem has been formulated, but if we agree to discuss the succession in the way Serbia puts it, I am afraid that Belgrade will make its "succession" to prewar Yugoslavia an issue. Under no circumstances can we allow ourselves to lose our position as a successor to the former Yugoslav federation. The problem was complicated after some of the former Yugoslav republics gave up their previous positions, and therefore we must now construct our independent position in relation to this problem, which will be based on our own interests.

[Geroski] The VMRO-DP supported the Interim Accord between Macedonia and Greece. Both sides are now having official discussions, and some even claim that they are negotiating on the issue of the name. Will you continue to support the activities of Macedonian diplomacy?

[Golubovski] Basically—yes. I believe that there are discussions only on the differences in both sides' approach to this question and that the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia is not in dispute. It is exactly the firm position on not changing the name that ultimately deserved to be "serviced," that is, backed up by compromises in less painful questions, in which I have confidence in the policy created by President Gligorov. I believe that he stands firmly on this position.

Strategically Toward the Authority

[Geroski] There is an opinion that some economic, and perhaps political subjects as well, advocate the establishment of exclusive relations between Macedonia and Serbia.

[Golubovski] Our party has warned about the possible background of some economic subjects' overstressed objections in relation to the maintenance of the former Yugoslav market's mechanisms to which Macedonia used to belong in the past. I agree that such efforts contain political implications and they identify some political positions of the subjects in the country. Perhaps this is a topic that deserves a broader explanation of our view on the policy of equal distance. I personally believe that our formulation is more complete than the one promoted by the Alliance for Macedonia. We understand the policy of equal distance as an element of foreign policy that protects the the Macedonian nation's most vital national and state interests—the language, the nation, and the state. In this context we can accept special relations, for instance in the sphere of the economy, if the partner does not associate it

with negation of the Macedonian attributes. When the Alliance for Macedonia speaks about special relations, it leaves a very large space for different interpretations and speculations. In any case, no one of our neighbors can at this moment be our special partner if we understand the policy of equal distance in such a way.

[Geroski] The VMRO-DP declares itself as a party in opposition to the opposition. Is there an opposition in Macedonia at all?

[Golubovski] In addition to other things, an opposition formation must basically have a good infrastructure and politically designed platform. The problem in Macedonia is that no opposition political party has accomplished the two preconditions. Our party, for instance, is objectively in the lead of the opposition in relation to its political platform and political skill in dealing with the authority tactically and strategically. However, because of the underdeveloped infrastructure, our position is deliberately denied. As opposed to this, the two so-called bigger opposition parties' priority is recognized only because of their infrastructure.

[Geroski] The parties in the Alliance for Macedonia are naturally making efforts to keep up on the political scene their present "knocked-down" adversary, which is under their control. The main reason is that the adversary, being incapable of managing itself in conditions outside parliamentary activities, is continually losing its reputation, and therefore, even if the next elections are really carried out under regular conditions, it will not manage to threaten the ruling parties.

Disorganized Opposition

[Geroski] If what you are saying is true, then why would the ruling parties "install" a different schedule in the forces, that is, a stronger opposition?

[Golubovski] That is exactly what I am saying. That is why they are protecting the so-called bigger parties, because, otherwise, there would be room for new people and new options. In this way, there is a formal existence of the authority and the opposition, which discourages any renewal of the political space with alternative options.

[Geroski] You are probably aware that the other oppositions understand your diagnosis as an attempt to break up the opposition, probably directly inspired by the ruling parties.

[Golubovski] This thesis, which is actually an insinuation, makes sense if there is an organized political opposition, if there is mutual cooperation between the opposition parties, or if they even have a secret arrangement. The latest elections showed that they are a long

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way from reaching the political maturity that would enable them to form political coalitions. So, on the side of the opposition there is nothing that can be broken up. The term opposition in Macedonian political practice does not have the meaning that it has in other democratic states. In our case it is rather a product of the global process of transition. I do not believe that the political activities of these opposition parties will pass the test in a short period of time. This is also a defiance of the speculations that you indicated in your question.

[Geroski] It seems as though you blame the opposition parties for everything. What about those that are in power?

[Golubovski] Actually, my indications are theses that are advocated by a genuine opposition party. The oligarchies of the parties are making serious, above all strategic, mistakes and it is impossible to neglect this fact. If we talk about "blame," then I direct it first of all at the ruling parties—the position that they occupy imposes this responsibility on them. For instance, what is the meaning of the fact that these parties are self-sufficiently closing themselves up and not leaving a rationally large political space for the others? What is the meaning of the intolerance shown toward high-quality people who do not belong to them in a political sense, but who can offer appropriate solutions? What is the meaning of their arrogant claim that everything that is good in Macedonia was done by them? In this way, they "challenge" the careless opposition to respond irrationally, to deny the present authority, to deny this Macedonia, to wish to create another Macedonia.... This is how the door to rising political revenge is opened—in the future everybody may ask for a bigger victory, everybody may schedule the employed in the state administration and in other fields as it suits him. We cannot accept such agony. That is why we are in opposition to the authority, but also to the rest of the opposition. We have our own concept for Macedonia's future.

[Geroski] One has the impression that you are now talking as a man that has been personally affected, probably rejected as well.

[Golubovski] I am personally disappointed that I did not succeed in occupying a position that objectively belongs to me in the construction of the Macedonian pluralist ambience. However, there is something that is even more important: All the citizens of Macedonia, regardless of political affiliation, are objectively victims of the present policy, although I do not deny the real circumstances, which could be taken as some justification for what is happening to us.

LP Secretary Views Relations in Coalition

AU2712151495 Skopje VECER in Macedonian
25 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Liberal Party secretary Ace Kocovski by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "Somebody Is Pushing Us Outside the Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The peace arrangement for former Yugoslavia gives hope to the Liberal Party that finally there will be lasting peace and new prospects in the region. We discussed the fears that there is a secret plan for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the problem of the succession to former Yugoslav federation with LPM [Liberal Party of Macedonia] secretary Ace Kocovski.

[Kocovski] We start from the fact that Yugoslavia broke up because it could not survive, which was confirmed by the EU resolution, when all former Yugoslav republics were called to ask for recognition from the Western European Union, by which they had been recognized equal rights to state and legal succession. This is why we do not accept the plights of some who claim that Macedonia is not entitled to succession. As far as the peace arrangement is concerned, and as far as we know, there are not any officially signed documents related to Macedonia. It is true that history shows that secret plans of various services are possible. We must not be worried by that. It is important to see if we have enough consciousness and political force to oppose to such possible plans.

Equal Distance With All

[Geroski] Does your party have a firm stance that there cannot be any changes or suffixes to the name of the Republic of Macedonia under any conditions?

[Kocovski] Macedonia must consistently respect the Interim Accord with Greece that was signed in New York. Article 5 of the Accord says that there are differences over the name of the Republic of Macedonia and that discussions should be conducted in order to remove the differences.

[Geroski] What is your view regarding the excitement that the introduction of the new FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] customs regime caused among some economic circles here?

[Kocovski] The deblocking of the southern and northern border will enable many of our companies to become competitive with their products on European and world markets. Nevertheless, I must point out that as a party we were very surprised by the excitement of the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce and of some economists

after the introduction of the new FRY customs regime. Everybody in this state must realize that there cannot be a political equal distance without an economic one and that we cannot have an equal distance with three, and not with the fourth neighbor. Moreover, everybody must realize that Macedonia is a separate marketing and economic region.

[Geroski] What was the reason for such excitement? Is not a new political force emerging?

[Kocevski] I am afraid that there may be something else. Maybe the interests of some economic structures have been affected, because only they knew some channels through which they could do business with the FRY and make big money beyond regulations.

[Geroski] Have the liberals taken into the consideration some assessments which say that there is a slowdown in the democratic processes in Macedonia and that something must be changed, considering the unanimous parliament?

[Kocevski] It is a very important question for us and it deserves our attention. Our view is that the democratic processes at this moment are in a delicate phase. First, there was the assassination attempt against the president, and this is the cruelest attack against its sovereignty and democratic processes. As long as this is not clarified, the citizens will continue to feel that there is a hidden danger for the democratic processes and for their future, and that is why we are concerned when we hear that the inspirers, the planners, and the executors of this act may remain undiscovered for a number of years. Second, the democratic processes are moving with a timing that I personally am not satisfied with. Although we have achieved a lot, we are not entitled to say that we have achieved enough to be happy. The facts say that we are a long way away from many things that were planned—in the economic system, in social activities, and in the political system. The forthcoming period is creating conditions for the completion of the process of the judicial system, for progress in economic restructuring, and for revitalization of production....

[Geroski] ...and for parliamentary opposition?

[Kocevski] The democratic processes suffered great damage after the biggest opposition parties decided to leave the second round of the election. There is a lack of a strong and powerful opposition that can be a strong mechanism for control over the authority. I am now convinced that the opposition parties themselves suffered damage and that they have finally realized how important it is to have access to parliament's floor.

[Geroski] The opposition parties are to prepare a platform for minimum conditions for fair elections and they

want to discuss this with the ruling parties. Will you accept this?

[Kocevski] We are now preparing a letter to other parliamentary groups with which we want to open this question. It is a fact that extensive consultations must be made on such important legal projects as election laws.

[Geroski] Does this mean that new elections are approaching?

[Kocevski] Even if it does, we should not be worried. I think that the ruling parties must do their best to adopt new election laws as soon as possible, in order not to be blamed for projecting the laws the way it suits them, immediately before the elections.

Dispute With Ministers

[Geroski] What is taking place within the Alliance for Macedonia? We can read about polemics, we hear about long midnight government sessions, people are being reshuffled.

[Kocevski] The Alliance for Macedonia was formed just before the second round of the election as a result of the assessments on the time and demands of the members of the three parties. The purpose was to restore dignity to the executive house, to create a responsible government that will be able to continue the initiated reforms, and to have a president who will be trusted by all the citizens. We trust the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and we want to have honest and responsible cooperation. Actually, we do not have any disputes with the SDSM. Our disputes are with the government, regarding the government's attitude in perpetuating its functions. We use our legitimate right to make constructive criticism. Some people in the government want to make it appear that criticism of the government is based on our conflict with the SDSM in order to cover up their mistakes and weaknesses. They intimate that the SDSM members of parliament are close to the liberals if they criticize them. So, our assessment is that it is their intention to give stir constant conflicts between the SDSM and the LPM in order to be able to rule without any responsibility.

[Geroski] Who are these people?

[Kocevski] Well, I would not like to name them now, but I believe that the public knows that the disputes are not of a personal nature, but are based on a program and conceptual basis, schedule and selection of priorities in the processes of reforms.

[Geroski] Why do you not use the other institutional possibilities for expressing your dissatisfaction? There are interpellations, resignations....

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[Kocevski] The parliament group makes use of every possibility for criticism and for offering better solutions to which it is legally entitled. To suggest that the doors of the Alliance for Macedonia are not locked indicates the possibility that everybody who is not happy is free to go. Since this is permanently repeated, I feel that somebody is deliberately trying to have the Liberal Party pushed outside the Alliance, because he lacks the courage to do it himself. It is somebody's intention to make it appear that the LPM is acting as an opposition, with the aim of shifting the whole burden of responsibility onto its back for the failures in implementing what had been offered. We will not allow this to happen.

[Geroski] Do you claim that the problem is because there is not a common platform?

[Kocevski] The lack of such a platform in the Alliance and of the Alliance and the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] has proven to be very harmful. The theses that the Alliance for Macedonia is working by the platform of the SDSM because there were no other platforms are wrong and irresponsible. I say: If this is true, then why are there members of other parties in the government? They are certainly not there in order to implement the platform of only one party. Statements like "the doors of the Alliance are open" are irresponsible and just simplify the problem. Is there anybody who seriously believes that the Alliance will have the same legitimacy if a party abandons it? It is also absurd to claim that a party is forcing an internal-party different opinion and that at the same time it is not ready to show enough understanding for different opinions from other parties....

[Geroski] There are rumors that the Alliance will be expanded with other parties.

[Kocevski] Our position is that each of the parties in the Alliance should not necessarily state its view on this matter. We believe that there should precede a common agreement among the parties that form the Alliance.

[Geroski] What about the disagreements with the Socialists?

[Kocevski] The disagreements with the Socialist Party [SP] came as a result of its presence at some international meetings. The SP, as an independent subject, can attend any meetings and it is up to it to decide. However, it can do this only with its own platform and at its own expense. It must not involve the Alliance for Macedonia, because it is not committed by its contacts. It is unacceptable for SP delegations to attend meetings of former communist parties in the Balkans and to state there that it is in the interest of the present authority,

without specifying which segment of the authority they have in mind. We believe that this is not in the interest of the present authority and the SP must not present itself in such a way.

[Geroski] I presume that you are aware that there are speculations among a part of the public that the disagreements within the Alliance are partly a consequence of the alleged ambitions of your leader to take over the presidency after the assassination attempt against President Gligorov.

[Kocevski] There is really much speculation that does not have anything to do with real facts and truths. We have seen many strange reports circulated by the media. Some of them did not have the courage to do it directly with their own articles and commentaries and that is why they decided to broadcast very odd texts from the foreign media. We still do not know who initiated all this and what his ultimate intentions are. It is very dangerous for the state, after such an event, which attacks the country's sovereignty, when one plays with such qualifications and false information.

[Geroski] There is speculation that some businessmen who are oriented to the LPM are becoming close to Mr. Vasil Tupurkovski.

[Kocevski] I would, first of all, like you to tell me who these businessmen are. We do not have any such knowledge. Nobody can confirm the report of such a regrouping. This is also an integral part of what is happening on the political scene—some people in the state have started to generate talk about early presidential elections and about the president not returning to his position. It is obvious that those who are spreading such speculation and false information have calculated wrongly.

Weapon, Ammunition Sales in Tetovo Reported

96BA0052B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIA
in Macedonian 16 Nov 95 p 6

[Article by I.S.: "Weapons and Ammunition Resold"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 15 November.

Township public prosecutor Boris Milosavljevski informed us today, on the basis of criminal charges that the UVR [Internal Affairs Administration] filed, of a request for an investigation submitted to the Tetovo Township Court on Nedzat Sulejmani (1955) and Tjerim Aliji (1947), both from Poroj village, as well as the start of an investigation on Ismail Betjiri (1970) from Ciflik village; Bajram Bajrami (1955) from Poroj, temporary worker in Switzerland; Liman Sulejmani (1966) from Poroj; and Dzelal Emini (1961) from Selce, suspected of committing the crime of illegal ownership of weapons

or explosives. They illegally procured, sold, and kept in their possession firearms and ammunition.

According to the charge, Nedzat Sulejmani illegally acquired a substantial number of firearms and ammunition, including a 7.62-mm "Crvena Zastava" automatic rifle, and thirty 62-mm cartridges, which he bought for 1,300 German marks [DM] from Betjiri, and resold them to Bajrami for DM2,000. Nedzat Sulejmani illegally acquired a Chinese 7.62-mm caliber automatic rifle for DM900, which he then sold to Emini for DM1,000. Tjerim Aliji was actively involved in this transaction. He illegally acquired a 7.62-mm automatic rifle with 800 rounds of ammunition, which he sold to Liman Sulejmani for DM1,500, and a 7.62-mm "Crvena Zastava" semiautomatic rifle and one carbine with a sniperscope, from Czechoslovakia.

The Tetovo OJO [Township Public Prosecutor] issued criminal indictments against Daut Ziberi (1970) and Kasam Kasami (1954), both from Poroj village, who are suspected of committing a crime involving illicit possession of weapons or explosives. Ziberi, temporarily employed in Switzerland, paid 580 Swiss francs for a Hungarian-made 7.62-mm automatic rifle with 180 rounds of ammunition, which he managed to bring into the country and sell to Kasami for DM1,900.

ILS Equipment Planned for Skopje, Ohrid Airports
96BA0051A Skopje VECER in Macedonian
22 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Z.P.M.: "Precise Flying Systems"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the main problems which arise when the familiar Skopje fog appears is the impossibility of maintaining normal flights. Recently, because of thick fog, the Skopje airport remained closed to traffic for two days, and all traffic was diverted to the Ohrid airport. However, to a certain extent this problem will soon be eased, for as of 20 December the ILS (precise landing system) will be installed. This is part of the procured equipment for updating the flight control system.

As we know, the modernization is based on a loan from the European Development Bank, and 2 million German marks from this loan have already been used for the procurement of ILS systems for the two airports. These are exceptionally important instruments, and perhaps the best proof of their importance is that, even prior to signing the contract with the bank, the use of funds for their acquisitions was made possible. The previous systems were so old (24 years old in Ohrid and 22 in Skopje) that the one in Ohrid had become totally unusable, while in Skopje, after being out of

commission for three years, it was repaired but was not at all safe.

The new systems will make airplane guidance precise and, particularly important, will reduce the allowed minimal visibility in flying. Currently, the allowed visibility is to 1,600 meters. After the installation of the ILS system at Skopje airport, the required visibility will be 800 meters. According to Jovica Lazareski, interim head of the KL [flight control], after the main airport in the country has been upgraded to the second-category level, the allowed visibility will be reduced to 500 meters. This can be achieved with the modernization of the flight control equipment (which is currently being done) as well as the reconstruction of the runways and the light signals. A new loan will be approved soon by the same bank for these purposes. In practical terms, the new modern light signaling system and KL equipment will make possible the development of air communications with a visibility of 500 meters. This means that if fog descends on Skopje during the winter, the airport will be able to remain open to traffic for a longer period of time. Unless, naturally, under conditions (which have occurred in Skopje) when the fog is so thick that no equipment can keep the traffic open.

Poll: Majority Favors Government Reorganization
AU16121614957

[FBIS Editorial Report] Skopje PULS in Macedonian on 15 December on pages 16-17 carries a 2,700-word report on the results of an opinion poll on reorganizing the government in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The report says that 300 citizens were randomly contacted by phone "between 8 and 11 December. Forty-seven percent of the respondents were male and 53 percent were female; 25 percent were between 18-29, 24.33 percent were between 30-39, 23.33 percent between 40-49, and 27.33 percent were over 50. Some 0.33 percent were uneducated, 8 percent had an elementary education, 57.67 percent had secondary education, and 34 percent had a university education. For employment, 35.33 percent worked in the public sector, 14.33 in the private, 2.33 were private owners, 26.67 percent were unemployed, 4.33 were university students, 0.67 were pupils, and 16.33 were retired."

The results of the poll are presented below:

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What is your opinion of the government's first year of work?

	Percent
Positive	35.67
Negative	26
Barely positive	24.67
Do not know	13.67

Did the coalition government act in a unified way during this period?

	Percent
Partly	40.33
No	29.67
Yes	18.67
Do not know	11.33

Should the government be reorganized?

	Percent
Yes	68.67
It is still early	14
No	10
Do not know	7.33

What did the the government pay the most attention to?

	Percent
International relations	Over 65
Do not know	Over 10
Completion of laws	Over 5
Itself	5
Economic development	Under 5
Interethnic relations	Under 5
Current economic policy	Under 3

Prime Minister Not To Suspend Official Duties

WS2812114695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 28 Dec 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Prime Minister Will Not Rest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I will not take leave," stated Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy yesterday [27 December] in the "Signals of the Day" radio program.*

"My desire to take a holiday to rest was politically interpreted as following the advice I was given, for various reasons, to suspend my office, to disappear, to stop showing my face, to stop performing my duties," said Oleksy. "These suggestions are difficult to understand. I would like to believe they are an expression of goodwill and an effort to advance the entire clarification process. I myself hope it will be concluded as soon as possible, but this is hardly a reason to stop working."

Asked about the appeal extended by the Sejm commission [established to explain the espionage charges brought against Oleksy] to refrain from further dismissals in the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] after the removal of Deputy Minister Henryk Jasik, Oleksy said: "That appeal is bizarre. It clearly shows that the commission presupposes the prime minister will attempt to prevent the clarification of the affair or impede it. I wish to stress very firmly that (...) I will do nothing that will bring me personal gain and make things difficult for others. I do expect, however, the same of the other side. I wish the commission did not reach any premature conclusions—for example, about the validity of the charges."

"Why did you dismiss Deputy Minister Jasik?"

"Because I completely lost my trust in him."

"When will we learn the names of the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MSW, and the Ministry of National Defense?"

"On Thursday, I think, because it does not make sense to stall for time."

President, Sejm Speaker Discuss State Affairs

LD2812122895 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1154 GMT 28 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 28 Dec—After meeting President Aleksander Kwasniewski today, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych told journalists that current state affairs had been discussed. Asked whether the accusations against the prime minister were discussed, the speaker replied that "there was no reason to raise this issue."

Zych recalled that the accusations against the prime minister were being dealt with by the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Sejm Extraordinary Commission. This morning the speaker received the head of the Military Information Services and asked him to cooperate with the commission. Zych refused to comment on the view that the prime minister should take leave for the duration of the work of the commission.

The speaker also announced that the nominations for the posts of defense, foreign, and interior ministers would be discussed this afternoon during a meeting of the ruling coalition.

Later the president received Senate Speaker Adam Struzik. Meetings with representatives of the coalition and the opposition, including the leaders of the Union of Freedom [UW] and the Union of Labor [UP], are also expected today. A meeting with the chief of the General Staff has also been announced.

Politicians View Kwasniewski Presidency

WS2812081195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 20 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Chances and Threats of Kwasniewski's Presidency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A few days before Aleksander Kwasniewski is sworn into office, we asked several politicians about the chances and the threats of this presidency. Most politicians can see both, but there are also people who expect only disadvantages.*

Expected Advantages

Janusz Dobrosz, deputy chairman of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] Club, believes that the advantages of Kwasniewski's presidency will result from his experience and his knowledge, as well as from the experience of the political group he represents. The international contacts of Kwasniewski may also be useful. Dobrosz hopes to witness a different method of wielding the presidential powers, which should be milder, more rational, and less emotional; Kwasniewski declared he would do this.

Jerzy Gwizdz, head of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms and former head of Lech Walesa's campaign staff, cannot see any advantages in the fact that Aleksander Kwasniewski will be president. He claims that "because this presidency is beginning in such a way, it is hard to expect that things will be good and elegant later." This presidency depends on how much time Kwasniewski will need to offset the consequences of his bad start. A certain chance can be offered to the new

president by an objective factor—that is, fairly good economic conditions.

Tadeusz Iwinski, a deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], believes that Kwasniewski's presidency offers three big chances. First, it seems that cooperation in the power triangle—president-government-parliament—should develop quite well. Second, there is hope for national agreement. According to Deputy Iwinski, there is yet another optimistic fact: Aleksander Kwasniewski is, for a politician, relatively young, and, "despite all these affairs, he is fairly well educated and knows a lot." Perhaps he will manage to persuade the young generation to take part in public life. Iwinski is hoping the new president will place main emphasis on resolution of specific, important problems.

Union of Labor [UP] Deputy Tomasz Nalecz believes that Kwasniewski should resist the temptation of holding office for the purpose of protecting the SLD's interests. "Aleksander Kwasniewski proved shortly after the formation of the SLD that he is able to polish the concrete [hard-liners] left over by the Polish United Workers Party. It would be good if also this time he wanted to curb the aspirations of regional activists," says the UP leader.

Leszek Moczulski is waiting for "some positive signal from Aleksander Kwasniewski, a signal that would prove that Poland will not be turned into another Polish People's Republic [PRL]." "I am afraid, however, that such a signal will not come," the chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] fears.

Ryszard Czarnecki believes that Kwasniewski's presidency will offer chances only to himself and to his party. "The SLD will have a chance to treat Poland as a lemon that can be squeezed dry; Kwasniewski himself will try to prove that his quiet presidency will only stabilize the situation in Poland," we were told by the chairman of the Christian-National Union [ZChN].

Freedom Union [UW] Deputy Andrzej Potocki is only hoping that Kwasniewski, "who is beginning his term in such a violent situation, will try hard to prove to everyone that he is worthy of this office."

Possible Disadvantages

According to Janusz Dobrosz, threats result from the fact that the constitution gives only limited powers to the president. Just like the case of President Lech Walesa, people will expect from him more than he will actually be able to do. "Mr. Kwasniewski's voters are expecting that he will adopt a leftist approach to social problems, which I do not see in either Kwasniewski or the SLD; he is heading in the liberal direction," says the PSL deputy. It may happen that the new president will lose

his electorate. A threat to this presidency results from the fact that, during the campaign, people were divided according to the historical criterion. He also believes that Aleksander Kwasniewski will do his best to prove his European character, as a consequence of which he will tend to be more submissive in various negotiations with the West. It may happen, therefore, that, despite earlier suspicions, due to this submissiveness, Europe will tend to accept him more readily than Lech Walesa. It is not certain, however, whether this will produce good results for Poland. The strength of Kwasniewski's presidency will lie in his behavior and manners, in the fact that he is good-looking, nice. In other words, it will result from his personality, not from his platform. Moreover, Walesa never had his own government, whereas Kwasniewski does. On the one hand, this will make things easier for him, and, on the other, people's expectations will be all the greater.

Jerzy Gwizdz believes that all of the disadvantages of Kwasniewski's presidency will stem from the fact that all power has been taken over by one group. One of the things that prove that this is bad is the way SLD Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia holds his office. As a result of this phenomenon, there may appear trends toward ignoring the opposition and taking revenge.

Tadeusz Iwinski can see threats in something else: Part of the political scene may try to reconstruct the "nonexistent division in the post-Solidarity Poland and Poland of the leftist camp and, consequently, may refuse to reach an agreement." Some political forces may seek opportunities to take revenge for the presidential elections during the constitutional referendum. Moreover, there may appear some opposition to our integration with the European structures, and then we may witness emergence of a bloc of those forces that will jointly oppose integration with the European structures.

Leszek Moczulski fears most what he calls "turning Poland into another PRL." "I am afraid that democracy will be reduced to facades; the officially announced policies will differ from those that are actually implemented," says the KPN chairman. He also believes that leaders of the ruling party "have not learned anything since 1989."

According to Stanislaw Gebhardt of Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, the greatest threat posed by the presidency of Aleksander Kwasniewski is what on the surface seems to be the biggest chance: the fact that both the president and the parliamentary majority come from the same political formation and that they are able to cooperate successfully and without any conflicts. "From our viewpoint, the president will no longer veto laws that are unfavorable to

Poland," says Gebhardt; despite that, he hopes that the severity of the negative results of this unanimity of the authorities might be lessened by international pressure exerted by Western countries.

Deputy Tomasz Nalecz similarly assesses threats posed by the presidency of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Nalecz is afraid of the SLD as a party that has all the power. "This may encourage people in regional SLD structures to take advantage of this power without any restraints; in addition, the people in power may become arrogant, which we can see already in the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office," says the UP leader. Another threat, according to Nalecz, is posed by the "ruthless fight the Polish right wing has decided to wage with the president." "This fight may even threaten the stability of the state," the UP politician believes.

"Threats linked to this presidency have become clear now, before the term has begun, in the Justice Ministry. This president will be weak, whereas in the current international situation Poland needs a strong head of state," claims Ryszard Czarnecki. The ZChN leader also believes that now that the issue of his education has come up, Kwasniewski will not be able to be a respected president, a president who would improve the prestige of this office. Czarnecki also recalls that "Aleksander Kwasniewski is not an island." "His political base is waiting to take revenge on the Solidarity camp," the ZChN chairman believes.

"Even though the term has not even begun, I can already see increasingly fewer chances and increasingly more threats," says UW Deputy Andrzej Potocki. "An argument against Kwasniewski's presidency was, among others, the fear of restoration of PRL mechanisms—such as looking to the *nomenklatura* and party criteria, and not looking at the interests of the state before making appointments to high offices. The term has not begun yet, but Kwasniewski's colleagues have already closed their ranks, which is proved by actions taken by Minister Jaskiernia. I think this process will continue in the economy. The new president will certainly not oppose these actions. All of the declarations about a 'Poland for All' will lose their meaning."

Biographic Note on Head of Kwasniewski Cabinet
WS2712144395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 27 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "AN": "Marek Ungier"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marek Ungier], the head of the presidential cabinet is 42. He is a graduate of journalism and political science at Warsaw University and the Postgraduate Study Center for State Administration Employees. He was a member of the Polish United

Workers Party from 1974 to 1990, secretary of the Chief Council of the Union of Polish Socialist Youth, and head of one of the departments of the Youth and Physical Culture Committee (headed by Kwasniewski) in 1987-90.

In 1991 he started a private business but soon returned to the state administration. He is former director of the Progressus Foundation and former president of the Juventur Youth Travel Bureau. He was a member of the Supervisory Council of the Tourist Insurance Association. During the Pawlak government, he was appointed to the post of director general at the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. Prime Minister Oleksy appointed him deputy minister at URM in charge of the public administration reform and appointments of voivodes. He is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic. He is married and has two children.

Armed Forces Commanders Meet, Review '95 Plans
WS2812084895 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
27 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by A.F.: "Board of Commanders of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic; Things Are Good, but..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The process of restructuring of the Armed Forces, which consists of organizational and relocation activities in military units, has been 82-percent implemented. This is due to the state's financial shortages. This is a conclusion that can be drawn from the report that was submitted to the leadership of the General Staff by commanders of military units and the various arms of the Armed Forces during the session of the Board of Armed Forces Commanders held on 22 and 23 December in Warsaw.

During the discussion, it was emphasized that, despite financial difficulties, the Armed Forces maintained the planned pace of training and the planned combat readiness. However, as a result of lack of money, it was necessary to give up several bilateral training projects. Nonetheless, the Polish Armed Forces actively participated in the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program.

On behalf of Polish soldiers, members of the Board of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic sent a letter to outgoing President Lech Walesa thanking him for holding the office of commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

Prospects for Arms Sales Examined

WS1912154195 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA
in Polish 6 Dec 95 p 9

[Article by Andrzej Miklaszewski: "Arms Under Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *According to the estimates of the Stockholm Institute for Research on Peace, Poland is not now ranked among the first 15 leading arms exporters.*

Poland wants to join the New Forum, a new emerging world system to control the arms trade. It is not clear whether this is solely the intention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (being supervised by the president) or that of the whole government. Neither is it known how to square membership in the New Forum with last year's Sejm resolution, which required curtailing to a minimum arms trade export restrictions.

For the Polish arms industry, which has nearly collapsed, the news about the New Forum is bad. Yet membership in it is the price of acquiring NATO's protective umbrella. Doubts arise whether this price is not too high because the stake is at least \$1 million—that is, 240 million new zlotys. This is, for instance, the sum the military command lacks to transfer one of its divisions stationed on the Oder, where they are in excess, to the Bug, thus increasing the nation's security.

In 1986 Poland sold 1.1 billion transfer rubles and \$324 million worth of military equipment. Later its exports continued to systematically fall. In the estimate of the Stockholm Institute for Research on Peace, Poland is not now among the first 15 leading exporters. Five years earlier it was in seventh place.

The results dating 10 years back did not surely reflect the real export potential. Poland would easily grant credit for delivering military equipment to certain Third World countries, mostly Iraq and Syria. Both of them still owe us \$750 million. In other words, the exports were artificially overestimated because of the decisions made in Moscow.

It is worth noting that last year the so-called special exports of the Polish arms industry reached \$92 million,

and this year they are expected to reach \$95 million, which means they are increasing. In the opinion of experts, doubling exports lies within the reach of Poland's arms industry potential, of which only barely 20 percent is being used.

Joining the New Forum may hamper the increasing Polish arms exports. The Forum is going to impose additional export restrictions in the form of a blacklist of countries with which trade is forbidden. Lynn Davis, a U.S. under secretary of state, told the media that four countries would be placed on the list: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

The New Forum is to fill the gap that emerged with the dissolving of the Cold War system of COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls]. COCOM would prevent the sale of modern technologies that could also be applied in the defense sphere to Warsaw Pact countries.

In mid-1993, though, every Polish company that exported arms was obliged to observe the regulations "on imports from COCOM member countries." "The thing is," Tadeusz Strulak, adviser to the minister of foreign affairs, explained half a year ago, "to efficiently prevent arms exports to countries in high-risk regions such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya."

Daily on Charges by Russian Secret Services

WS2712144495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 23-26 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "TASS, MOP": "Russian Intelligence Officer Brings Charges Against ZYCIE WARSZAWY"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Vyacheslav Trubnikov of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Services claims that the reason for the current political crisis in Poland is a report carried by ZYCIE WARSZAWY. He deems the Polish press reports on Prime Minister Oleksy's alleged cooperation with the Russian secret services a premeditated political provocation. He failed, however, to mention the materials handed over by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the [Supreme] Military Prosecutor's Office.

New Military Regulations at Border With Bulgaria
AU2712185795 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI
in Romanian 21 Dec 95 p 8

[Article by George Radian: "Romania Establishes New Military Regulations at the Border With Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On his return from the visit paid to Bulgaria, Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina said: Both sides are obliged to notify each other whenever the Romanian or Bulgarian side organizes an action involving more than 6,000 people, 100 tanks, 200 armored cars, and 100 artillery pieces of 100-mm caliber or higher. The Romanian side may send observers to the other side if the troops and hardware involved in the exercises exceeds 7,000 people, 150 tanks, 300 armored vehicles, and 150 artillery pieces of 100 mm or more. No side is allowed to carry out military activities involving more than a battalion in an area less than 15 km from the border, except for navy troops and pontooner subunits.

The aim of the visit to the Bulgarian Republic was to sign a document on military cooperation between the Romanian Ministry of National Defense and the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense entitled "Accord on Supplementary Measures To Enhance Trust, Security, and Military Contacts Between Romania and Bulgaria."

The document stipulates obligations for the two armies to regulate their military activities on both sides of the border separating us. For Romania, the alignment is: Sf. Gheorghe, Tulcea, Galati, Ramnicu-Sarat, Ploiesti, Targoviste, and Dr. Turnu-Severin. For Bulgaria, the alignment is: Sozopol, Starazagova, Panagyurishte, and Pernik.

Funar Urges Nonsupport of Iliescu at Elections
AU2712150795 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL
in Romanian 23 Dec 95 p 7

[MEDIAFAX report: "Because He Likes Diggings of Every Kind, Gheorghe Funar Is Now Undermining President Ion Iliescu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday [21 December], Gheorghe Funar, the president of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] and the mayor of Cluj Municipality, called the entire population not to support President Ion Iliescu at the coming elections. In a speech he made at the solemn session [to mark the 1989 December events] at the Cluj local council headquarters, Mr. Funar stated: "The second-generation communists need to be replaced. As long as the leaders of the 1989 December coup have the power in their hands, no justice will be done and no change for the better will take place in Romania."

The PUNR president asserted that in December 1989 a coup was staged with the assistance of certain foreign forces and mercenaries and that the leaders of the coup stained their hands with the blood of the killed young people. He also forecast that the organizers of the coup will lose the coming elections, after which they will have to stand trial. He also accused the president of continually destroying evidence about the 1989 coup, that he made many key witnesses disappear, and that he is unable of leading the Army. "The supreme commander of the Romanian Army is still the same as in 1989. The generals must obey this commander, something that the Army did not do either," Mr. Funar asserted.

PRM Leader Opposes Privatization, Restructuring
AU2412142795 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian
18 Dec 95 p 5

[Interview with Ion Cristian Nicolae, president of the Romanian Workers Party, by Dorina Baesu; place and date not given: "Our Party Has a Very Collective Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Baesu] How do you feel privately, as "Mr." or "Comrade?"

[Nicolae] In our party, everybody can call themselves as they please. Generally speaking, I am "Mr." with all people and "Comrade" with my fellows in struggle, the drivers and workers. I cannot be a "Comrade" with a professor or director.

[Baesu] Are you a worker?

[Nicolae] Yes, I have always been a worker. I only have 12 years of schooling. My basic profession is car driver, but I am also a shoemaker, like Ceausescu was. Until the congress of the Romanian Workers Party [PMR], I was chairman at the Textile Artisan Cooperative. I also have a truck, which is currently undergoing repairs, with which I earn my living.

[Baesu] Where do you drive it?

[Nicolae] I have a truck of 29 metric tons, with which I transport commodities abroad. Last year I was in Syria and Germany.

[Baesu] Are you Romanian? I am asking you this, because all those who led the former PRM [the name which the Romanian Communist Party took for a while, after World War II]—Stefan Voitec, Ana Pauker, Chisinevski—were either Jews or Russians.

[Nicolae] I am Romanian. It is no big tragedy that the party was previously led by people belonging to other nationalities. Even now, looking at our present

government, we can see that the large majority of its members are not Romanians.

The Calamity of 1989 Happened Because of the Mistakes Made by the Communists

[Baesu] There are many left-wing parties in today's Romania: The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], the Socialist Party [PS], and many others, three quarters of which declare themselves the successors of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR]. Why should there be a need for the PMR now?

[Nicolae] The PDSR is a center-left party, the same as the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]. But let us shed some clarifying light on all this, because it is one thing to claim that you are God, and another thing to be believed by others, who judge you by your deeds, that you are really God. The PS is more a party of intellectuals. These people have nothing to do with the workers. As a matter of fact, 29 PS members from the Bucharest organization came over to us. The PSM—I was a founding member of the PSM—is indeed a left-wing party, but I believe that one can no longer make this kind of policy with people who did what they did until 1989. The calamity of 1989 happened because of the mistakes made by the communists. The break between the working masses and the party leadership occurred in 1979-80, because of the so-called intellectual upstarts, who ran havoc in the party. That is why I deemed it necessary to lay the foundation of a workers party, but from the grassroots. We proceed from the premise that the workers should also be defended, because nobody mentions them any more.

We Call Ourselves the PRM Because There Are Too Many Socialist Parties Around

[Baesu] Everything that is bad in Romania's history is linked to the names of PMR and PCR. Are you not afraid that by taking up this name you are assuming responsibility for everything that has happened in the 50 years of communism?

[Nicolae] The PMR was OK at the beginning. It only changed afterward. One cannot clearly say when exactly the mistakes started happening. However, the moment they started coming, they grew like a tree. I must say that my interpretation of communism is a kind of socialism, where everybody fares better. We call ourselves PRM because there are too many socialist parties around.

[Baesu] The emergence of so many left-wing parties creates the impression that they are dispersing in order

to win over as many voters as possible, only to unite themselves after the elections, so as to grab hold of the entire power.

There Are Some People Infiltrated in Our Party Who Are Deliberately Doing a Disservice to the Left

[Nicolae] That would be the best thing, if the entire left were to unite itself. On one hand we have the Convention [Democratic Convention of Romania-CDR], on the other the PDSR. However, I do not believe the left will become united. People have been infiltrated in our party in order to destabilize us. Some go quite often to various other miniparties and slander all kinds of people, thus they are deliberately doing a disservice to the left. I disagree with your claim that everything is a diversion. I have appealed to 28 left-wing groupings to close ranks and create a united left, like the CDR is united. But the odds are nine to one against it, because there are too many conceits and interests at play here.

I Gave My Vote to Iliescu Because There Is No Better One Around Among Those Currently in the Field

[Baesu] You said that you also have relations of cooperation with the Communist Party of Targu Jiu, which was labeled as extremist in the report of the Romanian Intelligence Service. Do you agree with the leaders of this party, who consider Iliescu a traitor to the country for what he did in 1989?

[Nicolae] We had contact with those leaders and people and told them not to embark upon such an extremist course. Regarding Ion Iliescu, I proceed from the assumption that he is not guilty. So far, I have always voted for him and, as far as I can see in the field, there is nobody else around to vote for.

[Baesu] Still, at your conference last week, you said that the current power has reinstated the bourgeoisie in Romania. How can you vote for Iliescu if he is doing such a thing?

[Nicolae] I did not say that Iliescu is doing that. When I have proof that he favors the Paunescu brothers [George Constantin Paunescu, chairman of the Romanian National Employers Confederation and of the General Union of Romanian Industrialists] or Catarama [Viorel Catarama, industrialist and vice president of the National Liberal Party], then we will see. Until such proof comes up, we will not undertake anything against him. But I personally think that Iliescu does not have enough power. He should have more of it. Compared to Ceausescu, he is like a little child.

[Baesu] Do you have support from the working class?

[Nicolae] We have more than 11,000 members. We have supporters at the Vulcan and 23 August enterprises, at Galati Combine, in Craiova, Arad, and in some 22 counties altogether.

[Baesu] If you were in power, would you implement a nationalization program and take back the land given to the farmers?

[Nicolae] No. Regarding agriculture, we are against the present system of associations. The peasant should be left alone. He must know he has something that is his own, otherwise he is not going to put his heart in his work. We are in favor of encouraging private property.

The Recovery of the Large Enterprises Was Not Desired So That the West Could Buy Them More Cheaply

[Baesu] This means that you are not communists.

[Nicolae] We took over what was good from the communists. We are against the privatization of large enterprises, but are in favor of privatizing the service sector and the shops.

[Baesu] Why are you against the privatization of large enterprises?

[Nicolae] Because it is not good for people to be laid off. We are against the privatization and restructuring. If the wish had been present, all combines could have recovered within five years. But the recovery was not desired because of the West. The economy had to fall down to the lowest possible level, so that the dollar can go up and the West, as well as our own people with money, can buy the 70 percent share of the enterprises which is not being made available to the common people. It would have been much better for us if the decision had been taken that 50 percent of the profits of each enterprise must be obligatorily reinvested. But they could not care less. The interests of the workers are not defended in any way.

[Baesu] Will you adopt the slogan "Proletarians from all countries, unite" as your own?

[Nicolae] I would like to, but I cannot decide this on my own. My party has a very collective leadership.

Federal

Joulwan Thanks Milosevic for Hospitality to Troops
LD2812151595 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1456 GMT 28 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 28 (TANJUG)—NATO forces commander in Europe U.S. General George Joulwan Thursday said it was a great privilege for him to come to Belgrade at the time of joint efforts to restore peace.

At a news conference on arrival, Gen. Joulwan expressed his thanks to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for enabling NATO troops to use Belgrade airport as a transit station en route to Bosnia where they were to join multi-national forces of IFOR [Implementation Force].

He said this was a sign of good cooperation that existed with Belgrade and that he hoped it would be so also in Bosnia.

In his view, IFOR's mission would be ended in a year's time and that the multi-national force has no mandate to search for suspected war criminals.

Greeting the citizens of Yugoslavia and the region, Joulwan said NATO has come solely to bring peace and assessed that the reception of IFOR in Bosnia has so far been very good.

After the news conference, Joulwan explained to the just arrived U.S. soldiers the tasks expecting them in Bosnia.

He also told them that deployment thus far of the multi-national force was unfolding rather well and that the soldiers could expect a good reception from all conflicting sides in Bosnia.

Joulwan set out that the soldiers that arrived in Belgrade on Thursday en route to Bosnia were on a historic mission that was to enable the restoration of peace.

Army Commander, Joulwan Confer

LD2812140995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1251 GMT 28 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 28 Dec (TANJUG)—Col-Gen Momcilo Perisic, chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Army, accompanied by his aides, today received a delegation of NATO forces in Europe headed by U.S. General George Joulwan.

General Joulwan's arrival in Belgrade is connected with the transit across the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the first contingent of U.S. armed forces within the Implementation Force [IFOR].

According to the Information Service of the Yugoslav Army headquarters, Generals Perisic and Joulwan discussed cooperation between the Yugoslav Army and the NATO forces command in implementing the peace agreement on Bosnia and other questions of mutual interest which are to contribute to the stabilization of security in the Balkans and in Europe.

Kontic Outlines Government's Main Tasks in 1996

LD2712190095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1846 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 27 (TANJUG)—The Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Radoje Kontic said the main tasks facing Yugoslav Government in 1996 were the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement and of the agreement on the Srem-Baranja region, the lifting of international community sanctions against Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia's full reintegration in the international community and economic recovery of the country.

In an interview Wednesday during a visit to Yugoslav news agency TANJUG, Kontic pointed out that 'political developments of crucial and historic importance for the definite resolution of the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful and political manner took place in 1995, to our great satisfaction.'

'By initialling the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton and signing the agreement in Paris, and by signing the peace agreement on the Srem-Baranja region, extremist and militant forces have finally been defeated,' Kontic underlined.

'Peace and common sense have prevailed—the supreme national and state goals of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,' Kontic said.

The Srem-Baranja region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK—Serb state in Croatia) that Croatia has not occupied.

In Croatia's aggressions on the western, northern and southern parts of RSK in the beginning of last May and the beginning of last August, about 4,000 Serb civilians were killed and over 260,000 were forced to become refugees, and their homes were looted and burned.

Kontic highly evaluated TANJUG's activity in 1995, pointing out that the agency has demonstrated top professionalism in reporting on developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the world.

Court: Law on Military Courts Unconstitutional
*AU2712171295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
 in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Federal Constitutional Court has determined that certain regulations within the law on military courts and the law on the military prosecutor are not in accordance with the FRY Constitution, since these regulations stipulate that the Yugoslav president appoints and dismisses the chairman, judges, and jurors of the military courts, and the military prosecutors at the suggestion of the federal defense minister, that is, in wartime at the suggestion of the Chief of General Staff.

The Federal Constitutional Court has determined that these regulations limit the constitutional function of the president of the republic, and are thus in violation of the FRY Constitution. [passage omitted]

President Lilic, Tajik Prime Minister Confer
*LD2712185895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
 in Serbo-Croatian 1646 GMT 27 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Dec (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic has received Tajikistan's Prime Minister Jamshed Karimov.

In cordial talks, the two sides expressed a desire to strengthen the otherwise good relations between their two countries, in particular in the area of the economy.

President Lilic said that the two countries have experienced a period of serious confrontation with the consequences of extremism—indirectly in the case of the FRY, or directly in Tajikistan, where a civil war was raging until recently. Both sides agree that peace and a decent standard of living are the most pressing aims of both countries.

Prime Minister Karimov stressed that the two countries have such a strategic position that the international community must recognize that without peace in the two countries, there can be no peace in the regions in which they constitute a focal point. The eminent guest thanked President Lilic for the full support which the FRY has given toward preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Tajikistan, and for our readiness for economic cooperation which will facilitate the more successful development of both economies.

President Lilic stressed that economic recovery is now our priority. Our aim is also to develop comprehensive good-neighborly relations, to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Balkans and Europe, and to regain full membership of all international organizations.

In order to achieve this we will give full support to the activities of the international community, I for, and all countries and institutions which are involved in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, President Lilic stressed during his meeting with Tajik Prime Minister Karimov.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Janko Radulovic, federal minister for science, development, and the environment, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic.

Article Views Cooperation With Hague Court
*AU2712153095 Belgrade POLITIKA
 in Serbo-Croatian 17 Dec 95 p 14*

[Article by Jelena Arsenovic: "Cooperation with The Hague Only Within the Framework of the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The International War Crimes Tribunal had to release from a Dutch prison a Croatian Defense Council officer of Muslim nationality suspected of having committed war crimes, on the grounds that "the lawful time limits had been exceeded and there was a lack of evidence." The public was informed by the tribunal that the investigation against the suspect would be resumed and that charges would be brought against him only after Belgrade responded to the request to provide the necessary evidence.

Thus, for the first time since the establishment of the Hague tribunal in May 1993 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 827 a person suspected of having committed crimes against Serbs was released from prison—because of a legal formalism. Regarding the above-mentioned additional evidence, the Hague tribunal contacted the Serbian president, since the answer that "the responsible Yugoslav authorities had passed on the request for additional evidence to the responsible authorities in the Serbian Republic" had come from his office. The problem is that it came too late so that—according to agency reports—the Croatian Defense Council officer was released from prison.

Restrictions by Law

The first news contained only the information that the request for additional evidence had been sent to the responsible Yugoslav authorities. The first institution local reporters could contact was the Committee for Collection of Data on Crimes Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, which has existed for two years now as an independent institution of the federal government.

Through the work of the committee one understands the FRY's relationship with the Hague tribunal. "We were

neither established nor do we exist because of the tribunal. For us, it is more important to retain the evidence for the future when the proper truth is recognized: That Serbs are victims at least to the same extent as the others," Zoran Stojanovic, Committee chairman, professor at Novi Sad Law School, and former federal minister of justice, told us. The professor immediately added, however, that "those who underestimated the tribunal were wrong, because it had to be taken seriously in spite of the fact that it was not a proper court, because it is an institution supported by politics."

"We support certain forms of cooperation that do not oppose our Constitution and our laws," Stojanovic said. He explained that the problems were extradition (the Constitution and laws do not allow extradition of Yugoslav citizens) and independent investigations in the territory of the FRY, since foreign states or institutions, the Tribunal in this case, were not allowed to make them.

The committee, which consists of nine experts (all lawyers except for Zoran Stankovic, a medical doctor) and officials, has up to now submitted four reports about war crimes committed in the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia to the federal government and to the UN secretary general. (The first two of six reports all together, were made by the federal government).

"Mr. Goldstone, the main prosecutor, has reproached us for not submitting evidence. He is partially right, but we must protect witnesses. A large number of them do not want their names to be published, for various reasons," Mr. Stojanovic explained to us, asking at the same time why the tribunal did not try to launch an investigation on the basis of the material submitted to the United Nations by the committee.

Apart from video and photographic material, expert opinions (first of all in the field of forensic medicine), investigation reports, and sketches of the scene of the crime, the most common evidence the committee has and keeps in its folders are eyewitness accounts. People who witnessed crimes do not want to cooperate, however. Some of them out of fear for their own lives, some because they have relatives and are afraid for their lives. Professor Stojanovic cited the example of the Krajina population: People are either apathetic or angry with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, they think that they should have been protected from the Croatian aggression, so that they do not even want to cooperate with the committee. "Especially when they hear that materials are submitted to the United Nations," Mr. Stojanovic says, "because all of these people witnessed the cooperation of 'blue helmets' with the Croatian

aggressor." The professor, as a cautious lawyer, also mentioned that certain things pointed to the possibility that the committee had lost many witnesses, since they easily got entry visas even for those countries that normally make difficulties about issuing them.

"I saw the reports of the United States of America and other foreign governments. They mostly use the press as the major source, which our committee does not do," Stojanovic told us. That these reports are not convincing can be seen from the examples of events that are impossible in real life, such as the U.S. report in which it was mentioned that the Serbs kept 70 Muslims in a room of 8 square meters for three and a half months!

Witnesses of Crimes

Professor Stojanovic mentioned that there were examples in those reports in which Serbs were not presented only as criminals but also as victims. We asked him whether some of the committee cases treat events in which Serbs were not victims but criminals, and Stojanovic answered that there had been one such case (Vuckovic). Yugoslav judicial authorities are in charge of it and criminal proceedings have been opened against him in Sabac.

Stating that this was the most frequent question asked by foreign reporters, the committee chairman explained why one might have the impression that the committee was biased. He said that, regardless of the good cooperation between the committee and the responsible commission in the Serbian Republic, committee members had problems when investigating in the field. He said that, apart from that, the committee only had access to the area controlled by Serbs and that refugees who came to Serbia had certainly not been victims of Serbs. He says that it is only natural that Muslims contact their institutions in Sarajevo and Zenica that do the same job as the Yugoslav Committee, and that the Croats contact their State Commission, their Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the Institute for the Research of Genocide.

The professor asks himself, however, why certain local nongovernmental organizations, which reproach the committee for being biased, have not submitted the evidence about the crimes committed by Serbs at least to the tribunal in the Hague—if they did not want to submit it to the committee—since they can trust the tribunal more than a federal government authority. In the two years of its existence, the committee has not made use of repressive measures that it is entitled to according to the law. Persons who have information on a particular crime and do not want to submit it may be punished with up to a year of imprisonment.

Finance Minister on Economic Ties With Bulgaria
AU2012121695 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 15 Dec 95
 p 6

[Interview with Jovan Zebic, FRY deputy prime minister and minister of finance, by Milka Stefanova; place and date not given: "Banking in Yugoslavia Is Vital"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stefanova] Mr. Zebic, how do you assess the current state of economic cooperation with Bulgaria?

[Zebic] The tendency that emerged in implementing bilateral economic cooperation in the last years prior to the introduction of the sanctions placed the Republic of Bulgaria among Yugoslavia's significant foreign trade partners. During the period of the UN sanctions, Bulgaria assumed an exceptionally correct position toward the FRY and rendered it maximum help within the framework of the possibilities allowed by the international embargo.

With the suspension of sanctions we are expecting significant progress in all spheres of cooperation based on supplementing the two countries' economies and mutual interests and goodneighborly relations.

[Stefanova] You have clarified with Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev financial relations and forms of payment. What is the precise current picture?

[Zebic] UN sanctions were the reason for the emergence of a relatively low number of specific and unresolved issues in the sphere of regulating mutual debts and claims:

Bulgaria owes the FRY \$1,230,000 as the principal and \$93,000 as interest on credit allocated in 1983. The compensation activity related to this credit is implemented by the importer Universal, while the factor which allocated the credit is the 14 October Enterprise in Krusevac;

Yugoslavia owes Bulgaria \$370,000 for equipment that has been imported;

Bulgaria owes Yugoslavia DM1.7 million for credit for the purchase of sugar and cooking oil from the state reserve;

Bulgaria owes the Federal Flight Control Administration about \$7 million in taxes for flights of Bulgarian aircraft;

Yugoslav Railroads owes Bulgarian Railroads about \$12 million.

With the suspension of UN sanctions and the anticipated revival of economic activity between the two countries, the majority of these debts and claims will be settled through trade, on the basis of agreements between

the two countries' interested economic factors, except for the Yugoslav claim related to goods delivered to Bulgaria from the state reserve, an issue that will be resolved at the international level. Otherwise, we have agreed to involve the appropriate ministries of the two countries in settling mutual debts and claims, if we feel that their participation will accelerate the solution of problems.

[Stefanova] What bilateral agreements will be signed?

[Zebic] We have agreed that at the beginning of 1996 the expert coordination of the Agreement on Mutual Protection and Stimulation of Investment and the Agreement on Avoiding Double Taxation will begin. These agreements will strengthen the institutional prerequisites and stimuli of developing bilateral cooperation, especially in the sphere of direct investment, which is of exceptional importance for us under conditions of the great decapitalization of the Yugoslav economy caused by the sanctions. [passage omitted]

[Stefanova] As FRY deputy prime minister, how do you assess the state of the Yugoslav economy after the sanctions?

[Zebic] Undoubtedly sanctions have caused stagnation in certain financial functions, but banking in Yugoslavia is vital because our banking system has well trained personnel, who have utilized the lull in business to follow developments throughout the world and prepare for the period after the lifting of sanctions. Generally, this inspires optimism over the possibilities of successfully returning to foreign financial markets and business trade exchange.

National Bank Governor Discharged From Hospital
LD2712132195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1256 GNT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 27 Dec (TANJUG)—Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, was discharged from hospital today in a satisfactory health condition, the governor's office has announced. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Socialist Leader Predicts Purge at Party Congress
LD2612232095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 2045 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pancevo, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—Svetislav Krstic, deputy chairman of the Vojvodina Provincial committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia, said tonight in Pancevo that the emphasis of preparations for the third party congress will

be on purging the ranks of the Socialist Party of Serbia of those who have become rich in a dishonest way or have in any other way brought the party into disrepute. [passage omitted: new members joining the party]

The deputy chairman of the provincial committee said that the Socialist party of Serbia is consistent in safeguarding peace and national interests, which was the motto the second party congress held in 1992. [passage omitted]

Arkan's Guard To Become 'Regular Unit'

AU2712181095 Belgrade NASA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by N.T.: "Arkan's 'Tigers' Going to Bosnia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The Serbian Voluntary Guard [SDG] could soon become a part of the armed forces of the Serb Republic, Borislav Pelevic, acting chairman of the Party of Serbian Unity, hinted at yesterday's news conference. The SDG, as this party says, does not intend to demobilize.

Recalling that, following the withdrawal from western Bosnia, the SDG has been stationed in Erdut, Pelevic said that the "Tigers" would abide by the agreement on the Srem-Baranja region. "Thirty days after the arrival of the peace forces in this region, when the demilitarization of the Serb soldiers and police is envisaged, the SDG will withdraw but it will not demobilize."

Rejecting the possibility of stationing the "Tigers" in the FRY (except unless there is an armed rebellion in Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija] or Raska [Sandzak]), Pelevic said that there was room for the SDG in other Serb lands, and asked: "Why should we not be a regular unit in the army or the police force of the Serb Republic, when everyone knows how much we helped them there?" Pelevic was suspicious that only the Serbs would respect the Dayton agreement, while the other two sides would not.

[Box, p 4]

State of Emergency in Party

Pelevic said that the Party of Serbian Unity had yesterday declared "a state of emergency" in all its committees, which announces the start of the election campaign. He said that "the situation on the front" was preventing Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan from "defrosting" his function of party chairman, and "freezing" his function of SDG commander.

Magazine Confiscated for Attacking Milosevic

AU2712185095 Belgrade NASA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 95 p 16

[Report by "M.M.": "Police Against 'Greater Serbia'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Belgrade police confiscated several hundred copies of the latest issue of the monthly VELIKA SRBIJA [GREATER SERBIA] (Serbian Radical Party [SRS] magazine) from the magazine's street vendors, we have learnt from the SRS.

The police operation came on the evening of 23 December. During the afternoon of the same day, VELIKA SRBIJA was sold in the center of the city by SRS Deputies Drasko Markovic, Petar Dimovic, Djordje Nikolic, Dusica Nikolic, and Aleksandar Vucic.

According to Vucic, the police confiscated issues of VELIKA SRBIJA at several points in Novi Belgrade, and receipts for the confiscation (not explained) were issued only in two cases at the Novi Belgrade flea market.

The only explanation the street vendors got from the police was that they could not sell papers attacking Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "just like that."

"The police said that they would instigate legal action against our street vendors, and the only explanation they would give was that 'you cannot get away with attacking the best president in the world unpunished,'" Dragomir Pavlovic, chairman of the Novi Belgrade SRS committee, told NASA BORBA.

We have found out that the Radicals would try and find out the names of the policemen that confiscated the papers, and then investigate the possibility of obtaining legal protection for their street vendors and magazine.

Article Views Tudjman's New Stance on Prevlaka

AU2712211995 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES
in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 95 p 5

[Article by Simonida Simonovic: "Bosnia—the Key to the Sea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite its loud announcement, it still did not come to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Zagreb in Paris. On the contrary, it seems that during the conference on disarmament held in Bonn, the two sides drifted apart even more, and there is hardly anybody now who knows when and how this (un)expected turn—which was feared by enthusiasts, and with certainty predicted by skeptics—will be overcome.

As it is well known, the core of the problem is Prevlaka since Tudjman changed his mind in connection with

that arrangement at the last moment. After the Dayton agreement had been signed, the public was informed that part of the Dubrovnik hinterland held by Bosnian Serbs would be given to Croatia in return for full [Yugoslav] control over the small peninsula of Prevlaka, which, from a geographic and strategic point of view, is a very important issue for Montenegro and, naturally, Yugoslavia.

Step Back

Counting on that "arrangement," both Belgrade and Zagreb businessmen hurried to resume the interrupted relations and to precisely agree on future big business, equally important for both sides. After the Paris meeting, however, there followed a cold shower since Tudjman stated that there would be no business before mutual recognition, and there cannot be mutual recognition as long as the Prevlaka problem has not been solved.

This problem has proven to be very complicated, since—according to Tudjman's understanding of things—"the Dubrovnik hinterland held by Bosnian Serbs is actually part of the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been recognized by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that Yugoslavia cannot offer something in return that does not belong to it." That is why Tudjman stepped back, requiring that this conflict be solved by international arbitration.

After Paris, the Montenegrins were naturally very angry with that "turn" since such an option was not mentioned in Dayton. It is interesting, however, that there are no special details related to the agreement on Prevlaka in the rather general and publicly known 136-page Dayton agreement. This may mean that the agreement on Prevlaka was either only oral (gentlemen) or that it was defined in some other additional text or secret document—if there is such a document at all.

It can be unofficially heard from Yugoslav diplomatic circles that nobody from the Yugoslav side is ready to give his consent to an arbitration about Prevlaka, so that the whole thing is being returned almost to the beginning. International arbitration, as it was agreed on in Dayton, remains valid only for the Posavina corridor, but Mate Granic has in the meantime tried to renovate his old tactic in Bonn—setting conditions and exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to recognize Croatian sovereignty over eastern Slavonia.

What in the Dayton agreement could be referred to the problem of Prevlaka, and how could these stipulations be interpreted?

The basic problem is the territory in the Dubrovnik hinterland held by Bosnian Serbs. Under whose sovereignty is it, and who can decide on its exchange?

Is the "Answer" in the Bosnian Constitution?

According to one interpretation, this territory belongs to the Serbian entity—which means that it is part of the Serbian Republic territory. The Serbian people, who will be separated from the rest of Bosnia by a 4-km wide demarcation line, has sovereignty over it. According to the draft for a new constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian entity will have its own institutions and it will be entitled to merge with other states and nations, which could be considered as full sovereignty over its country.

Apart from that, the same constitution draft, which was accepted by all three sides, foresees that the central government controls the following fields: Foreign policy and trade, customs, monetary policy and financial liabilities, immigration and refugees, the unique criminal laws and cooperation with Interpol, the establishment of communications and transport between the entities as well as the control of air traffic. This means that the central government has no influence on territorial matters of the entities.

Another bundle of rules, also written down in the constitution draft, says that "every entity can make arrangements with other states and organizations—with the consent of the parliamentary assembly." The assembly itself can determine for which types of contracts and arrangements its consent will not be necessary! As an annex to all this, there follows an invisible but perhaps the most important attitude (from paragraph 3 of the draft), which may help resolve all the confusion: "All national and governmental functions not explicitly stated in the draft of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina will automatically become matters of entities."

This premise allows various conclusions. One of them is that the Serbian Republic can decide independently about the exchange of its territories, which means that it could participate in the tripartite deal: It could give Croatia the Dubrovnik hinterland, Croatia could give Montenegro the Prevlaka peninsula and all of them together some more access to the sea.

Tudjman's attitude regarding the right to exchange territories is that the Bosnian Parliament will have to decide on it. This can, however, be the case only after the new constitution has been adopted, which can only happen after a multiparty election—in the best case in six to nine months.

It is not very likely, however, that the Serbian side will agree to anything like that. It is even less likely that both of them will have the patience and reasons to wait that long. This even more so since the problem does not lie in an insurmountably large piece of territory but

rather in the principle and in the agreement, which, at least in Dayton, seemed to be very reliable and into whose implementation also the organizers of the Dayton meeting invested their authority.

Montenegro

Parliament Adopts Budget for 1996

LD2612234295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 2238 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—Deputies of the Montenegrin Parliament tonight adopted the republic's budget for next year of 1.1 billion dinars. That is 120 percent more than this year.

The largest part of the budget resources will be used for routine state functions, financing the economy, and public works programs.

The budget was adopted thanks to the votes of deputies from the Democratic Party of Socialists, who have the majority in parliament. The opposition deputies voted against, after having set out numerous criticisms of the planned volume of funds and certain clauses on the distribution of funds.

They particularly insisted on the disclosure of foreign exchange reserves, stressing that by refusing to disclose this information, the Montenegrin Government is in breach of the republic's Constitution.

Tonight deputies of the Montenegro Assembly moved on to the next item of the agenda—the proposed changes to the law on public information. A debate on this topic will be held tomorrow.

Two Opposition Parties Protest Radicals' Expulsion

LD2112204495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 21 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 21 Dec (TANJUG)—The Assembly of Montenegro today began its second autumn session by stating that the mandate of the eight deputies [expelled from assembly] of the Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro [SRS CG] expired before the end.

On the proposal of the Mandate and Immunity Commission, Ilija Darmanovic, Acim Visnjic, Milenko Gazdic, Drago Bakrac, Ljubomir Ilic, Miroljub Cirovic, Milos Kustudic, and Slavko Loncarevic were stripped of their mandates as assembly deputies because they were expelled from the SRS CG in March 1994.

The expelled Radicals are not allowed to turn to the assembly in connection with a report by the above commission, because the assembly is not empowered

to discuss such matters. It can only acknowledge the established facts.

At the same time, a number of proposals submitted by the expelled Radicals have been taken off the agenda.

The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro said that the commission's decision is a blow to parliamentarianism. At the request of the Liberals, the assembly deputies held a vote to decide whether the standing orders had been violated by expelling the deputies. A majority of deputies decided that there was no violation.

The People's Party also voiced its protest, assessing as suspicious the way in which the eight deputies had been stripped of their mandate.

The Montenegrin assembly is also expected to vote on the draft republic's budget for next year, as well as on several draft laws submitted by the People's Party and the Liberal Party of Montenegro.

Kosovo

Just Solution to Albanian Issue Demanded

AU1612161395 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian
15 Dec 95 p 19

[Report by the Kosovo Information Center: "Kosovo Will Not Kneel in Face of the Serbian Terror"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prishtina, 14 December (QIK)—The presidency of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova [PShDKK] held a meeting yesterday presided over by academician Mark Krasniqi. The meeting discussed several issues on the current situation in Kosova and found out that the situation of the Albanian people in Kosova under the conditions of the Serbian occupation is becoming increasingly grave. The repression and police violence of the Serbian power installed in Kosova against Albanians has become unceasing. Maltreatments of Albanian individuals and families and the police raids have become a daily practice. All these put forward to the Albanian political subjects in the Republic of Kosova the need for a greater commitment to contribute to the international pressure over Belgrade to give up its discriminating and genocidal policy against the unprotected Albanians.

The PShDKK Information Center reports that the meeting assessed as very fruitful the contacts that academician Mark Krasniqi held with diplomats and the representatives of the political parties of some countries, who participated in the congress of the Albanian Christian Democratic Union held in Tirana sometimes ago. The Kosovars do not kneel in face of the fierce terror of the Serbian occupation. In the nationwide referendum held

in September 1991 they declared Kosova a republic, a sovereign and democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, irrespective of religion and nationality. We want the problem of Kosova and Albanians in general in the territories of the former Yugoslavia to be resolved fairly through a democratic dialogue, agreement, and peace. However, if the great powers think that, even this time, they can play at the expense of the Albanian peo-

ple, peace in the Balkans will not last long. The problem of Kosova and that of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Montenegro, Presheve [Presevo], Bujanovc [Bujanovac], and Medvegje [Medvedja] can be solved only through their self-determination, academician Mark Krasniqi told foreign diplomats, the PShDKK Information Center reports.

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